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Optimal Capital Injections with the Risk of Ruin: A
Stochastic Differential Game of Impulse Control and
Stopping Approach
David Mguni∗†
Abstract
We consider an investment problem in which an investor performs capital injections
to increase the liquidity of a firm for it to maximise profit from market operations.
Each time the investor performs an injection, the investor incurs a fixed transaction
cost. In addition to maximising their terminal reward, the investor seeks to minimise
risk of loss of their investment (from a possible firm ruin) by exiting the market at
some point in time. We show that the problem can be reformulated in terms of a
new stochastic differential game of control and stopping in which one of the players
modifies a (jump-)diffusion process using impulse controls and an adversary chooses a
stopping time to end the game. We show that the value of this game can be computed
by solving a double obstacle problem described by a quasi-variational inequality. We
then characterise the value of the game via a set of HJBI equations, considering both
games with zero-sum and non-zero-sum payoff structures. Our last result demonstrates
that the solution to the investment problem is recoverable from the Nash equilibrium
strategies of the game.
Keywords: Impulse control, stochastic differential games, optimal stopping, jump diffusion,
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, optimal liquidity control, lifetime ruin, transaction costs.
1 Introduction
There are numerous environments in which financial agents incur fixed or minimal costs
when adjusting their investment positions; trading environments with transaction costs, real
options pricing and real estate and large-scale infrastructure investing are a few important
examples. The study of optimal investments by an economic agent who seeks to minimise
the probability that they go bankrupt within their lifetime is known as the probability of
lifetime ruin problem. The problem was introduced by [MR00] and studied in depth by
[You04].
Despite the breadth of the literature concerning the lifetime ruin problem and the
widespread occurrence and influence of transaction costs on investment behaviour, current
models within the literature have yet to include those in which the investor faces financial
transaction costs1. The absence of transaction costs within the theoretical analysis limits the
scope of application of the lifetime ruin model to a wide number of instances within financial
systems. The objective of this paper is therefore to generalise the lifetime ruin problem to
problems the investor now faces transaction costs when modifying their position.
In order to tackle this problem, we introduce a new stochastic differential game of con-
trol and stopping in which the controller uses impulse controls to modify the dynamics of
∗Quantitative and Applied Spatial Economic Research Laboratory, University College London, Gower
Street, London, WC1E 6BT, UK.
†Centre for Doctoral Training in Financial Computing & Analytics, University College London, Gower
Street, London, WC1E 6BT, UK. davidmguni@hotmail.com
1One exception is [Zer10] in which a single-controller problem is analysed - however, in [Zer10] the
controller’s action space is limited to two actions wherein the model in [Zer10] can thus be viewed as regime
switching model with switching costs.
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a (jump-)diffusion process and show that this theoretical framework represents the theoret-
ical abstraction of the investment problem which we later to use generate solutions to the
problem.
We specifically concern ourselves with an optimal firm liquidity control problem with
lifetime ruin in which an investor performs capital injections to increase the liquidity of a
firm. In this instance, the investor seeks to maximise his capital injections to buoy the firm’s
liquidity process whilst seeking to minimise the probability of loss of investment by exiting
the market (selling all firm holdings).
Our analysis shows that by representing the investment problem as stochastic differential
game of control and stopping with impulse controls enables the optimal solution of the
problem to be computed. A significant component of this paper is therefore concerned with
studying the stochastic game which leads to a full characterisation the value of the game
using PDEs (HJBI equations). We then generalise the results to cover the game with a
non-zero-sum payoff structure and generalise the results to provide a characterisation of the
Nash equilibrium of the non-zero-sum game. To complete our study, we lastly show that
the solution to the optimal liquidity control and lifetime ruin with transaction costs can be
recovered from the equilibria of the non-zero-sum stochastic differential game enabling the
optimal solution for the investement problem to be computed using solutions to a joint set
of PDEs.
Theoretical Background
Impulse control problems are stochastic control models in which the cost of control is
bounded below by some fixed positive constant which prohibits continuous control, thus
augmenting the problem to one of finding both an optimal sequence of times to apply the
control policy, in addition to determining optimal control magnitudes. We refer the reader
to [EBY11a] as a general reference to impulse control theory and to [VLVP07; PS10] for
articles on applications. Additionally, matters relating to the application of impulse control
models have been surveyed extensively in [Kor99]. Impulse control frameworks therefore
underpin the description of financial environments with transaction costs and liquidity risks
and more generally, applications of optimal control theory in which the system dynamics
are modified by a sequence of discrete actions.
Stochastic differential games with impulse control (in which two players modify the sys-
tem dynamics) have recently appeared in the stochastic impulse control literature. Deter-
ministic versions of a game in were first studied by [Yon94; TY93] - in the model presented
in [Yon94], impulse controls are restricted to use by one player and the other uses continuous
control. Similarly, in [Zha11] stochastic differential games in which one player uses impulse
control and the other uses continuous controls were studied. Using a verification argument,
the conditions under which the value of game is a solution to a HJBI equation is also shown
in [Zha11]. In [Cos12], a stochastic differential game in which both players use impulse
control is analysed using viscosity theory.
Problems that combine both discretionary stopping and stochastic optimal control have
attracted much attention over recent years; in particular there is a notable amount of litera-
ture on models of this kind in which a single controller uses absolutely continuous controls to
modify the system dynamics. Discretionary stopping and stochastic optimal control prob-
lems in which the controller exercises modifications through the drift component of the state
process (using absolutely continuous controls) have been studied by [KO02; Ben92; KS99a;
KW00]. Another version of these problems which has attracted significant interest is prob-
lems in which the controller acts to modify the system dynamics by finite variations of the
state process - such problems have been studied by [DZ94; IKW00].
A related family of models has recently emerged in which the task of controlling the
system dynamics and exit time is divided between two players who act according to separated
interests [OkB13a; NZ14]. Controller-Stopper games were introduced by Maitra & Sudderth
in [MS96], however, the game remains to be studied extensively notwithstanding notable
papers such as [KS99b] who study a game in which the underlying system dynamics are
given by a one-dimensional diffusion within a given interval in R. Other papers on the topic
include [KS99b] and [BH13]; in the latter, a multidimensional model is studied wherein the
state process is controlled on a diffusion in a multidimensional Euclidean space. A game-
theoretic approach to stochastic optimal control problems with discretionary stopping has
been used to analyse the lifetime ruin problem in [BY11a; OkB13a; NZ14] amongst others.
Within these models, the task of controlling the investment process and selecting the
market exit time is assigned to two individual players who each seek to maximise some
form of the same objective payoff functional. Game-theoretic formulations of the optimal
2
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stochastic control with discretionary stopping model can be viewed as generalised versions of
the single controller models wherein the investor is now allowed to seek multiple objectives
which are each defined over multiple payoff functions.
Within the body of literature concerning stochastic differential games of control and
stopping however, the set of controller is restricted to an absolutely continuous class of
controls (e.g. [EBY11b; EBY11a; MS96; KS99b; KZ08]). This renders the aforementioned
models unsuitable for prescribing solutions for investment problems with fixed minimal costs
as continuous adjustments would result in immediate ruin.
Organisation
The paper is organised as follows: in section 2, we give a complete description of the
optimal liquidity control problem and construct the main investment model of the paper. In
section 3, we give a technical description of the game and introduce some of the underlying
concepts required in the script. In section 4 we prove some preliminary results that underpin
the main analysis which is performed in sections 5, 6 and 7 though we postpone some of the
technical proofs of section 4 to the appendix. In section 5, we study the controller-stopper
game with impulse controls with a jump-diffusion process and prove a verification result. In
section 6, we generalise the results of section 5 to non-zero-sum games. In section 7 we apply
the results of section 5 to derive the optimal investment strategies the model in section 2.
We initiate the paper with the optimal liquidity control with lifetime ruin problem that
the model studied in this paper addresses; however, the general results found in the paper are
broadly applicable. The problem is one of minimising the probability of lifetime ruin whilst
maximising some utility criterion. For a complete treatment of the background and origins
of this problem, we refer the reader to [OkB13a; NZ14; BY11b] and references therein.
The following presentation of the problem is loosely based on the problems presented in
[BY11b; Mk07; JMZ09].
2 Investment Problem
We concern ourselves with the lifetime ruin problem within an investment context. The
objective of this section is to develop a framework through which the optimal policies of
a probability of lifetime ruin model in which (fixed) transaction costs are present can be
characterised.
The problem of how an investor should inject capital to raise a firm’s liquidity process in
order to maximise the investor’s terminal reward is known as the optimal capital injections
problem. In this environment, the investor injects capital into the firm to increase available
liquidity in order that the firm be able to pursue its market objectives.
The central task of the optimal liquidity control problem is to characterise the optimal
sequence of timing and magnitude of the capital injections to be performed by the investor.
The problem of when capital injections should be performed (and when dividends should be
paid) by the firm is an area of active research within theoretical actuarial science to which
a great deal of attention has been focused. Current models within the literature, the opti-
mal capital injections and dividends model is represented as a single-player impulse control
problem in which the controller seeks the optimal sequence of capital injections. In [Kor99]
a model in which the firm can seek to raise capital (by issuing new equity) to be injected
so as to allow the firm to remain solvent is considered. We refer the reader to [Kor99] and
[Zer10] and references therein for exhaustive discussions.
The problem we address in this section is one in which a firm investor seeks to both max-
imise the availability of liquidity to the firm whilst minimising the risk of loss of investment
due to firm ruin. Following the notion of ruin in classical ruin theory, we define ruin as the
first time at which some surplus process (or liquidity process) goes negative.
In the problem we study, the investor faces transaction costs so that and each capital
injection incurs some fixed minimal cost.The investor seeks to maximise their terminal re-
turns by performing the maximal sequence of capital injections at selected times that their
wealth process can tolerate. However, the investor also seeks an optimal time to exit the
market by selling all firm holdings before firm bankruptcy.
In the following construction, we formulate the optimal liquidity control and the lifetime
ruin problem as a stochastic differential game in which two players each seek to fulfil one of
the investor’s objectives. Some of the ideas for the following description of the problem are
loosely adapted from the (continuous control) descriptions of problem presented in [BY11a;
Mk07].
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Description of The Problem
We now provide a description of the lifetime ruin and optimal liquidity control problems.
First we outline the key features of the general problem. In particular we will introduce three
separate processes, namely the firm’s liquidity process and the investor’s wealth process after
which we will be in a position to construct a complete description of the problem. Finally, we
will describe the problem with fixed or minimally bounded costs which defines the problem
we wish to solve.
We start firstly by describing the firm’s liquidity process Xs = X(s, ω) ∈ R× Ω at time
s ∈ [t, T ] - a stochastic process defined over some time horizon T ∈]0,+∞[.
When there are no capital injections, the firm’s liquidity process evolves according to the
following expression:
dXs = e(r − 1)ds+ σf (s,X
t,x0
s )dBf (s) + Sf (s), X
t,x0
t := x ;P− a.s. (1)
where x ∈ R is the firm’s initial surplus, e ∈ R+ is a constant that describes the firm’s rate of
expenditure and r ∈ (0, 1) is the firm’s rate of return on capital. The term Sf (s) captures the
stochasticity of the firm’s liquidity process and is given by Sf (s) :=
∫
γf (X(s−), z)N˜f(ds, dz)
where N˜(ds, dz) ≡ Nf (ds, dz)−ν(dz)ds is a compensated F−Poisson random measure where
ν(·) := E[N((0, 1], V )] for V ⊂ R\0, and Bf (s) ∈ R which is a 1−dimensional standard
Brownian motion; coupled with the functions2 σf : [t, T ]× R→ R and γf : R× R→ R.
Each time the investor performs a capital injection, the investor incurs a cost - the cost
function c associated to the injections is given by c(τ, z) := exp−δτ (κI + (1 + λ)z) , where
κI is a fixed transaction cost and the parameter λ > 0 determines the proportional cost
for an injection of size z. Since performing continuous actions would result in immediate
bankruptcy, the investor’s capital injections must be performed over a discrete sequence of
investments.
The investor therefore performs a sequence of capital injections {zk}k∈Z over the horizon
of the problem which are performed over a sequence of intervention times {τk(ω)}k∈N. We
denote the investor’s control by the double sequence (τ, Z) ≡
∑
j∈N zj · 1{τj≤T} ∈ Φ where
the set Z is a feasible set of investor capital injections and T ⊆ [t, T ] is the set of intervention
times and Φ ⊆ T × Z.
Denote by e ∈ R+ the proportion of capital flows expended by the firm and by T
(τ,Z)
s :=∑
m≥1 zm · 1{τm<τS∧s} - the investor’s capital injections process. With capital injections,
the firm liquidity at time s ∈ [t, T ] is then given by the following expression:
Xs = x+
∫ s∧ρ
t
(r − e)Xt,x,(τ,Z)r dr +
∫ s∧ρ
t
σf (r,X
t,x,(τ,Z)
r )dBf (r) + T
(τ,Z)
s∧ρ
+
∫ ∫ s∧ρ
t
γf (X
t,x,(τ,Z)
r− , z)N˜f (dr, dz), (2)
P−a.s..
In order to complete the description of the investor’s problem we construct the notion of
risk of ruin facing the investor. As in [OkB13b] and in the sense given by [PAH98; FS02a],
let θ be a convex risk measure, then we can write the risk measure associated to the problem
is given by:
θ(X) = sup
Q∈Ma
EQ[−X ]− χ(Q), (3)
where Ma is some family of measures s.th. Q ≪ P and where EQ denotes the expectation
w.r.t. Q ∈ Ma and χ :Ma → R is some convex (penalty) function.
Since the investor seeks to minimise risk of null returns, the investor seeks to exit the
market by selling all holdings at a point ρ(Ω) ∈ T that minimises the risk θ(X) of the
investor’s returns falling below m (after firm ruin) before T , where ρ ∈ T where T ⊆ [t, T ] is
a set of F−measurable stopping times. From now on we will consider only the case m = 0.
We now observe that since the investor seeks to exit the market in advance of firm ruin,
we can describe the investor’s optimal stopping problem by the following representation
∀ X ∈ [t, T ]× Ω:
inf
ρ∈T
[
sup
Q∈Ma
EQ[−X ]− χ(Q)
]
, (4)
2We assume that σf and γf are deterministic, uniformly continuous, measurable functions.
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where the function χ :Ma → R is a given function
3,4.
The firm’s liquidity process is therefore raised by capital injections performed by the
investor, however in performing capital injections, the investor’s wealth is reduced since
liquidity is transferred from investor to firm. The investor however receives a return on
capital through some running stream and some terminal reward after liquidating all holdings
in the firm.
The investor’s wealth at time s ≤ T is Ys = Y (s, ω) is a stochastic process; denote
by pi ∈ [0, 1] the portion of the investor’s wealth invested in risky assets and by T¯
(τ,Z)
s :=∑
m≥1 exp
−δτm [(1+λ)zm+κI ] ·1{τm<τS∧s} which is the total deductions from the investor’s
wealth process due to the injections, then Ys is given by the following:
Ys = y +
∫ s∧ρ
t
ΓY t,y,(τ,Z)r dr − T¯
(τ,Z)
s∧ρ +
∫ s∧ρ
t
piσI(r, Y
t,y,(τ,Z)
r )dBI(r)
+
∫ ∫ s∧ρ
t
piγI(Y
t,x,(τ,Z)
r− , z)N˜I(dr, dz), P− a.s.
(5)
where δ, r0, µR ∈ R ∈ R are constants describing that are the investor’s discount rate, the
interest rate and the expected rate of return on the risky assets. The constant Γ is given
by Γ := (1 − pi)r0 + piµR. The term N˜I(ds, dz) ≡ NI(ds, dz) − ν(dz)ds is a compensated
F−Poisson random measure and BI(s) ∈ R is a 1−dimensional standard Brownian motion.
If we now interpret optimality of the stopping time ρ(Ω) in a sense of risk-minimal w.r.t.
the risk measure θ we can reformulate the problem in (4) and the investor’s maximisation
problem in terms of a decoupled pair of objective functions. Focusing firstly on the investor’s
capital injection problem, we can write the problem as:
Find an admissible strategy (τˆ , Zˆ) ∈ Φ s.th.:
(τˆ , Zˆ) ∈ arg sup
(τ,Z)∈Φ
J
(1)
I (s, x, y, (τ, Z), ρ) (6)
where
J
(1)
I (s, x, y, (τ, Z), ρ) = E
[ ∑
m≥1
e−δτmzm · 1{τm<τS∧ρ}
]
, (7)
∀ (s, x, y) ∈ [t, T ]× R× R, ρ ∈ T .
The following expression represents the investor’s optimal stopping problem which seeks
an optimal time to exit the market:
Find an admissible strategy ρˆ ∈ T s.th.:
ρˆ ∈ inf
ρ∈T
sup
Q∈Ma
J
(2)
I (s, x, y, (τ, Z), ρˆ) (8)
where
J
(2)
I (s, x, y, (τ, Z), ρˆ) = −e
−δ(τS∧ρ)
(
X
t,x,(τ,Z)
τS∧ρ + λT
)
, (9)
where λT := λ¯T δ
s
τS∧ρ and τS := inf{s ∈ [t, T ] : Xs, Ys < 0} ∧ T .
The expressions (7) and (9) fully express the investor’s set of objectives. We can combine
the expressions (7) and (9) to construct a single objective function Π given by the following
expression ∀ (t, x, y) ∈ [t, T ]× R× R:
Find an admissible strategy (ρˆ, (τˆ , Zˆ)) ∈ T × Φ s.th.:
ρˆ ∈ arg inf
ρ∈T
Π(s, x, y, (τˆ , Zˆ), ρ) (10)
(τˆ , Zˆ) ∈ arg sup
(τ,Z)∈Φ
Π(s, x, y, (τ, Z), ρˆ) (11)
3We observe that the problem in (4) can be viewed as a zero-sum game between two players; namely a
player that controls the measure Q which may be viewed as an adverse market and the investor who selects
the stopping time ρ ∈ T . Games of this type are explored in [NZ14] and [Mk07].
4We shall hereon specialise to the case χ ≡ 0 in which case the risk measure θ is called coherent
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where
Π(s, x, y, (τ, Z), ρ) = E
[
sup
Q∈Ma
EQ
[
− e−δ(τS∧ρ)
(
X
t,x,(τ,Z)
τS∧ρ + λT
)]
+
∑
m≥1
e−δτmzm · 1{τm<τS∧ρ}
]
, (12)
It can now be seen that the problem is now to find the interdependent set (ρˆ, (τˆ , Zˆ)) ∈
T ×Φ. If we now think of the two objectives (7) and (9) as being assigned to two individual
players, we recognise the pair of problems (7) and (9) as jointly representing a stochastic
differential game of control and stopping in which the controller modifies the system dy-
namics using impulse controls.
The problem involves a risk-minimising investor seeks to maximise their liquidity input
into the firm through capital injections whilst seeking an optimal exit time with concern for
a suboptimal early ruin. The underlying structure of the model is a stochastic differential
game of control and stopping in which the investor has dual objectives. Each of the investor’s
objectives is delegated to an individual player who plays in such a way as to maximise their
own objective whilst seeking an optimal response to the other player.
In section 5, we provide a PDE characterisation of a general formulation of stochastic
differential games of control and stopping involving impulse controls. We then apply the
results to show that the optimal investment strategy for the problem can be recovered from
the (saddle point) equilibrium strategies of a stochastic differential game of control and
stopping with impulse controls.
3 Current Literature
Since its introduction to the literature, a considerable amount of work has been dedicated
to the study of the lifetime ruin problem in addition to a number of variants of the problem.
Variations of the original problem include models with stochastic consumption [BY11a],
stochastic volatility [EBY11b], ambiguity aversion [EBY11a] amongst many other works.
Clearly, the probability of lifetime ruin model can be extended to address an analogous
problem within the context of an investor who holds some portfolio of risky assets who seeks
to both maximise their return whilst finding the optimal time to exit the market.
A common approach to study the lifetime ruin problem is to model the problem as an
optimal stochastic control problem in which the controller seeks both an optimal investment
strategy (modelled using absolutely continuous controls) and an optimal time to sell all
market holdings. Thus, in general the lifetime ruin problem in which the investor also seeks
to maximise their returns can be formulated as an optimal stochastic control problem with
discretionary stopping.
In general, lifetime ruin problems in which the investor also seeks to maximise some
performance criterion can be reformulated as stochastic differential games. The intuition
behind this is that given a sufficient player aversion to lifetime ruin, nature can be viewed
as a second player with the first player responding to nature’s actions in such a way that
seeks to avoid the occurrence of lifetime ruin.
In [BY11a], it is shown that the single investor portfolio problem in a Black-Scholes
market in which an investor seeks to both maximise a running reward and minimise the
probability of lifetime bankruptcy exhibits duality with controller-stopper games. Indeed,
in [BY11a] it is shown that the value function of the investment problem is the convex
dual of the value of a controller-stopper game. Similarly, in [OkB13a] an investor portfolio
problem with discretionary stopping is analysed by studying an optimal stopping-stochastic
control differential game and proving an equivalence.
In [OkB13a], the value for a game in which the stopper seeks to minimise a convex risk
measure defined over a common (zero-sum) payoff objective is characterised in terms of
a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Variational Inequality (HJBVI) to which it is proven that the
value is a viscosity solution. The inclusion of a convex risk measure, as outlined in [78],
[79], serves as a means by which risk attitudes of the investor are encapsulated into the
model, furthermore, the zero-sum payoff structure of the model implies that the strategies
are appropriate for the extraction of optimal strategies in worst-case scenario analyses.
6
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Contributions
This paper introduces a controller-stopper game in which the controller uses impulse
controls; the results cover a general setting in which the underlying state process is a jump
diffusion process. We extend existing game-theoretic impulse control results to now cover
games in which i) the underlying state process is a jump-diffusion process and in contrast
to [Cos12] ii) the payoff is no longer restricted to a zero-sum structure.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to deal with a jump-diffusion process within a
stochastic differential game in which the players use impulse controls to modify the state
process. Lastly, also to the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to provide results
pertaining to a non-zero-sum payoff structure within stochastic differential games for a
controller-stopper game in which impulse controls used.
A related paper to the current is [OkB13a] in which conditions for a HJBI equation are
proved for controller-stopper games in which the controller uses continuous controls.
In the following section we describe the details of a general version of the controller-
stopper game thereafter, we prove two key results: we firstly prove a set of verification
theorems that characterise the conditions for a HJBI equation in non-zero-sum and zero-
sum games. As in the Dynkin game case and controller-controller case, the HJBI equation
is an obstacle problem in particular, the HJBI equation is an obstacle quasi-variational
inequality.
We begin by giving a canonical description of the game dynamics, starting with the zero
sum game.
The Dynamics: Canonical Description
Let C(U ;G) be the set of continuous functions from some set U ⊆ R to a field G. The
index s ∈ [t, τS ] is time which runs continuously over some random and possibly finite time
horizon τS . We denote the coordinate mapping on C([t, τS ];R
p) by Bs(ωB) = ωB(s) and
denote also by F = {Fs}s∈[t,τS] the completed natural filtration and define {Ft,s[t, τS ]} to be
{Fs}s∈[t,τS] restricted to the interval [t, s] (uncompleted natural filtration). Correspondingly,
we also denote by Wt,t′ a σ−algebra generated by the paths in C([t, τS ];R
p) up to time t′
and let B(s) ∈ Rp be a p−dimensional standard Brownian motion with state space S.
N˜(ds, dz) = N(ds, dz)− ν(dz)dt is a F−Poisson random measure with ν(·) := E[N(1, ·)] is
a Le´vy measure; both N˜(ds, dz) and B(s) are supported by the filtered probability space
and F is the filtration of the probability space(Ω,P,F = {Fs}s∈[t,τS]). We assume that N
and B are independent. As in [TY93], we note that the above specification of the filtration
ensures stochastic integration and hence, the controlled jump diffusion is well defined (this
is proven in [Zha11]).
We suppose then that the uncontrolled passive state X ∈ S ⊂ Rp(p ∈ N), evolves
according to a (jump-)diffusion on (C([t, τS ];R
p), (F(t,s)s∈[t,τS ]
,F ,P0) that is to say for s ∈
[t, τS ], X ∈ S ⊆ R
p the state process obeys the following SDE:
dXt,x0s = µ(s,X
t,x0
s )ds+ σ(s,X
t,x0
s )dB(s) +
∫
γ(Xs−, z)N˜(ds, dz), X
t,x0
t := x0. (13)
∀ s ∈ [t, τS ], (t, x0) ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p;P−a.s.
The generator of X (the uncontrolled process) is:
Lφ(x) =
p∑
i=1
µi(x)
∂φ
∂xi
+
1
2
p∑
i,j=1
(σσT )ij(x)
∂2φ
∂xi∂xj
+ Iφ(x) (14)
∀ x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p, where I is the integro-differential operator defined by:
Iφ(x) :=
l∑
j=1
∫
Rp
{φ(x+ γj(x, zj))− φ(x) −∇φ(x)γ
j(x, zj)}νj(dzj), (15)
∀x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p.
The state process is influenced by impulse controls u ∈ U exercised by player I where
u(s) =
∑
j≥1 ξj · 1{τj≤τS}(s) for all s ∈ [t, τS ]. The impulses {ξi} ∈ Z ⊂ S are exercised by
player I who intervenes at F−measurable stopping times {τi} where t < τ1 < τ2 < . . . <
and where S ⊆ Rp is a given set. We assume U ⊆ Rp is a convex cone which is the set of
admissible control actions for player I and Z is the set of admissible impulse values. Indeed,
if we suppose that an impulse ζ ∈ Z determined by some admissible policy w is applied
at some F−measurable stopping time τ when the state is x′ = Xt,x0,·(τ−), then the state
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immediately jumps from x′ = Xt,x0,(τ−) to Xt,x0,w(τ) = Γ(x′, ζ) where Γ : Rp×Z → Rp is
called the impulse response function and (t, x0) ∈ [t, τS ]×R
p. We assume that the impulses
ξj ∈ Z are U− valued and are F−measurable for all j ∈ N.
For notational convenience, as in [OkB13a], we will use u = [τj , ξj ]j≥1 to denote the
control policy u =
∑
j≥1 ξj · 1{τj≤τS}(s) ∈ U which consists of F−measurable stopping
times {τj}j∈N and F−measurable impulse interventions {ξj}j∈N.
The evolution of the state process with interventions is described by the equation:
Xr = x +
∫ r
t
µ(s,Xt,x,us )ds+
∫ r
t
σ(s,Xt,x,us )dBs +
∑
j≥1
ξj · 1{τj≤τs}(r)
+
∫ r
t
γ(X(s−), z)N˜(ds, dz), (16)
for all r ∈ [t, τS ];P−a.s.
The game is s.th. player II can choose some F−measurable stopping time ρ ∈ [t, τS ]
at which point the process is stopped and both players receive a terminal cost (reward)
G(X). Player I has a cost function which is also the player II gain (or profit) function. The
corresponding payoff functions are given by the following expression which player I (resp.,
player II) minimises (resp., maximises):
Jρ,u(x) ≡ J(t, x0;u, ρ) = E
[ ∫ τs∧ρ
t
f(s,Xt,x0,us )ds+
∑
m≥1
c(τm, ξm) · 1{τm≤τS∧ρ}
+G(ρ,Xt,x0,uτS∧ρ )
]
, (17)
where x := (t, x0) and where the functions f : [t, τS ] × R
p → R, G : [t, τS ] × R
p → R are
deterministic functions which we shall refer to as the running cost function and the bequest
function respectively.
The results contained in this paper are built exclusively under the following set of as-
sumptions unless otherwise stated:
Standing Assumptions
A.1.1. Lipschitz Continuity
We assume there exist real-valued constants cµ, cσ > 0 and cγ(·) ∈ L
1 ∩ L2(Rl, ν) s.th.
∀s ∈ [t, τS ], ∀x, y ∈ R
p and ∀z ∈ Rl we have:
|µ(s, x)− µ(s, y)| ≤ cµ|x− y|
|σ(s, x) − σ(s, y)| ≤ cσ|x− y|∫
|z|≥1
|γ(x, z)− γ(y, z)| ≤ cγ(z)|x− y|.
A.1.2. Lipschitz Continuity
We also assume the Lipschitzianity of the running functions h, g, ψ and φ that is, we
assume the existence of real-valued constants ch, cg, cψ, cφ > 0 s.th. ∀s ∈ [t, τS ], ∀(x, y) ∈ R
p
we have for R ∈ {h, g, k, l, ψ, φ}:
|R(s, x) +R(s, y)| ≤ cR|x− y|.
A.2. Growth Conditions
We assume the existence of a real-valued constants dµ, dσ > 0 and dγ(·) ∈ L
1∩L2(Rl, ν), ρ ∈
[0, 1) s.th. ∀(s, x) ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p and ∀z ∈ Rl we have:
|µ(s, x)| ≤ dµ(|1 + |x|
ρ|)
|σ(s, x)| ≤ dσ(|1 + |x|
ρ|)∫
|z|≥1
|γ(x, z)| ≤ dγ(|1 + |x|
ρ|).
We also make the following assumptions on the cost function c : [t, τS ]× R
p → R:
A.3.
Let τ, τ ′ ∈ [t, τS ] be F−measurable stopping times s.th. t ≤ τ < τ
′ ≤ τS and let ξ, ξ
′ ∈ Z
be measurable impulse interventions. Then we assume that the following statements hold:
c(τ, ξ + ξ′) ≤ c(τ, ξ) + c(τ, ξ′), (18)
c(τ, ξ) ≥ c(τ ′, ξ). (19)
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A.4.
We also assume that the there exists a constant λc > 0 s.th. infξ∈Z) c(s, ξ) ≥ λc∀s ∈
[t, τS ] where ξ ∈ Z is a measurable impulse intervention.
Assumptions A.1.1 and A.2 ensure the existence and uniqueness of a solution to (13) (c.f.
[BY11b]). Assumption A.3 (i) (subadditivity) is required in the proof of the uniqueness of
the value function. Assumption A.3 (ii) (the player cost function is a decreasing function in
time) and may be interpreted as a discounting effect on the cost of interventions. Assumption
A.1.2 is required to prove the regularity of the value function (see for example [Yon94] and
for the single-player case, see for example [Mk07]). Assumption A.3 (ii) was introduced (for
the two-player case) in [JMZ09] though is common in the treatment of single-player case
problems (e.g. [Mk07; OkB13a]). Assumption A.4 is integral to the definition of the impulse
control problem.
Throughout the script we adopt the following standard notation (e.g. [TY93; OkB13a;
NZ14]):
Notation
Let Ω be a bounded open set on Rp+1. Then we denote by: Ω¯ - The closure of the set Ω.
Q(s, x;R) = {(s′, x′) ∈ Rp+1 : max |s′ − s|
1
2 , |x′ − x| < R, s′ < s}.
∂Ω - the parabolic boundary Ω i.e. the set of points (s, x) ∈ S¯ s.th. R > 0, Q(s, x;R) 6⊂ Ω¯.
C1,2([t, τS ],Ω) = {h ∈ C
1,2(Ω) : ∂sh, ∂xi,xjh ∈ C(Ω)}, where ∂s and ∂xi,xj denote the tempo-
ral differential operator and second spatial differential operator respectively.
∇φ = ( ∂φ
∂x1
, . . . , ∂φ
∂xp
) - The gradient operator acting on some function φ ∈ C1([t, τS ]× R
p).
Cd([a, b];U) - The set of ca´dla´g functions that map [a, b] 7→ U for some set U ⊆ Rp.
| · | - The Euclidean norm to which 〈x, y〉 is the associated scalar product acting between
two vectors belonging to some finite dimensional space.
As in [TY93], we will use the notation u ≡ [τj , ξj ]j≥1 to denote the control policy
u =
∑
j≥1 ξj · 1{τj≤τS}(s) ∈ U which consists of F−measurable stopping times {τj}j∈N and
F -measurable impulse interventions {ξj}j∈N.
4 Statement of Main Results
In this paper, we prove two key results for the game that characterise the value HJBI in
both zero-sum and non-zero-sum impulse controller-stopper stochastic differential games.
We prove a verification theorem (Theorem 5.1) for stochastic differential games with a
jump-diffusion process and in which one of the players uses impulse controls and the other
player chooses when to end the game. In doing so, we show that the value of the game must
satisfy a double obstacle quasi-variational inequality:
{max{min[−
∂V
∂s
− LV − f, V −G], V −MV } = 0
V (Xt,x,u(τs ∧ ρ)) = G(X
t,x,u(τs ∧ ρ)).
where L is the local stochastic generator operator associated to the process (16) and M is
the non-local intervention operator -we will use L to denote the local stochastic generator for
the controlled process, where it will not cause confusion we will also employ the shorthand
r(s,XS) ≡ r(XS) where r ∈ f,G - the constituent functions of the payoff function J .
In the non-zero-sum case we have the following result:
Theorem 6.2. Denote by φi the objective function for the non-zero-sum game for
player i ∈ {1, 2}, then the functions φi satisfy the following quasi-variational inequalities
∀y ∈ Rp, x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p:

max{∂sφ1(x) + Lφ1(x) + f1(x), φ1(x)−M1φ1(x)} = 0
max{∂sφ2(x) + Lφ2(x) + f2(x), φ2(x)−G2φ2(x)} = 0
φi(τS , y) = Gi(τS , y).
(20)
Having proven these results, we then implement the analysis to prove the following set of
results relating to the optimal liquidity control and lifetime ruin investment problem stated
in section 2:
Theorem 7.1. Suppose that the firm’s liquidity process x evolves according to (2) and
suppose that the investor’s wealth process y evolves according to (5), then the sequence
of optimal capital injections (τˆ , Zˆ) ≡ [τˆj , zˆj ]j∈N ≡
∑
j≥1 zˆj · 1{τˆj≤ρˆ∧T}(s) is characterised
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by the investment times {τˆj}j∈N and magnitudes {zˆj}j∈N where [τˆj , zˆj ]j∈N are constructed
recursively via the following expressions:
(i) τˆ0 ≡ t0 and τˆj+1 = inf{s > τj ;Y
(τˆ ,Zˆ)[t,s](s) ≥ y˜|y˜ ∈ R, Y ∈ S} ∧ ρˆ,
(ii) zˆj = yˆ − y(τˆj).
The fixed duplet (y˜, yˆ) is determined by the following equations:
φ′2(yˆ) = αI , (21)
φ2(y˜) = φ2,0(yˆ)− (κI + αI(yˆ − y)), (22)
φ′2(y˜) = αI . (23)
where the function φ2 is given by (93) and the function φ2,0 is given by:
φ2,0(x) = c(y
d1 − yd2), (24)
where the constants d1, d2, c ∈ R are given in (158) and (159) - (161).
The investor’s non-investment region is given by:
D2 =
{
Y ∈ S, s ∈ [t, T ];Y (s) < y˜
}
, (25)
The investor exits the market at ρˆ ∈ T where the exit time is defined by:
ρˆ = inf{s > t;X(τˆ ,Zˆ)[t,s](s) ·Q(s) /∈ D1|X ∈ S,Q ∈ R} ∧ τS , (26)
where the process Q(s) is determined by
Q(r) = Q(t) exp
{1
2
σ2fr − σfBf (r) +
∫ r
t
∫
R
(ln(1 + θˆ1(s, z))− θˆ1(s, z))N˜f (ds, dz)
}
, (27)
and the set D1 (non-stopping region) is defined by:
D1 =
{( ∂
∂s
+ Lθˆ
)
ψ(s, ·) > 0
∣∣∣s > t}. (28)
where the operator Lθˆ corresponds to the stochastic generator of the controlled process.
Theorem 7.1 says that the investor performs discrete capital injections over a sequence
of intervention times {τˆk}k∈N over the time horizon of the problem. The decision to invest
is determined by the investor’s wealth process - in particular, at the points at which the
investor’s wealth process reaches y˜, then the investor performs capital injections of magni-
tudes {zˆk}k∈N to increase the firm’s liquidity levels in order to provide the firm with maximal
liquidity to perform market operations. This in turn maximises the liquidity that the in-
vestor makes available to the firm whilst the investor remains in the market after which the
investor liquidates all investment holdings. However, if the firm’s liquidity process exits the
region D1, in order to avoid the prospect of loss on investment, the investor immediately
exits the market by liquidating all market holdings in the firm.
The fixed duplet (yˆ, y˜) is determined by (21) - (23). The non-stopping region D1 is
defined by (28). The function ψ is the investor’s value function and the operator Lθˆ is
the (controlled) stochastic generator. In section 7 we provide a full characterisation of the
investor’s value function.
From Theorem 7.1. we also arrive at the following result that enables us to state the
exact points at which the investor performs an injection, when the investor exits the market
and when the investor does nothing:
Corollary 7.2. For the optimal liquidity control and lifetime ruin problem, the investor’s
wealth process x lies within a space that splits into three regions: a region in which the
investor performs a capital injection - I1, a region in which no action is taken - I2 and lastly
a region in which the investor exits the market by selling all firm holdings - I3. Moreover,
the three regions are characterised by the following expressions:
I1 = {y ≥ y˜|y, y˜ ∈ S},
I2 = {qx > ω
∗, y < y˜|x, y, y˜ ∈ S;ω∗, q ∈ R},
I3 = {qx ≤ ω
∗|x ∈ S; q, ω∗ ∈ R},
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where q is the value of the process Q and the fixed duplet (y˜, yˆ) and the value ω∗ are
determined by (21) - (23) and (171) respectively.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to deal with a jump-diffusion process within a
stochastic differential game in which the players use impulse controls to modify the state
process. Additionally, to our knowledge, this is the first game that involves impulse controls
in which the role of one of the players is to stop the game at a desirable point.
We now give some definitions which we shall need to describe the system dynamics
modified by impulse controls:
Definition 4.1. Denote by T(t,τ ′) the set of all F−measurable stopping times in the
interval [t, τ ′], where τ ′ is some stopping time s.th. τ ′ ≤ τS , if τ
′ = τS then we will denote
by T ≡ T(t,τS). Let u = [τj , ξj ]j∈N be a control policy where {τj}j∈N and {ξj}j∈N are Fτj−
measurable stopping times and interventions respectively, then we denote by µt,τ (u) the
number of impulses the agent executes within the interval [t, τ ] under the control policy u
for some τ ∈ T .
Definition 4.2. Let u be an impulse control policy. We say that an impulse control is
admissible on [t, τS ] if the number of impulse interventions is finite P−a.s, that is to say we
have that E[µ(t,τS (u)] <∞.
We shall hereon use the symbol U (resp., T - which belongs to the set of all F−measurable
stopping times in [t, τS ]) to denote the set of admissible controls for player I (resp., player
II). Given two player I controls u ∈ U and u′ ∈ U ; we interpret the notion u ≡ u′ on [t, τS ]
iff P (u = u′) a.e. on [t, τS ]) = 1.
Similarly, given two player II stopping times ρ ∈ T and ρ′ ∈ T , we interpret the notion
ρ ≡ ρ′ on [t, τS ] analogously.
Definition 4.3. Let u(s) =
∑
j≥1 ξj · 1{τj<τS}(s) ∈ U be an impulse control defined
over [t, τS ], further suppose that τ and τ
′ are two F -measurable stopping times contained
within the interval [t, τS ], then we define the restriction u[τ,τ ′] of the impulse control u(s) to
be u[τ,τ ′](s) =
∑
j≥1 ξµt,τ+j · 1{τξµt,τ+j≤s≤τ′}
(s) where τ ≤ s < τ ′.
We denote by U[τ,τ ′] ⊂ U[t,τS] ≡ U the (restricted) set of admissible controls over the
interval [τ, τ ′].
Strategies
A player strategy is a map from the other player’s set of controls to the player’s own set
of controls. An important feature of the players’ strategies is that they are non-anticipative
-neither player may guess in advance, the future behavior of other players given his current
information.
We formalise this condition by constructing non-anticipative strategies which were used
in the viscosity solution approach to differential games in [FR02]. Non-anticipative strategies
were introduced by [FS02b; KO02; Ben92; KS99a]. Hence, in this game, one of the players
chooses his control and the other player responds by selecting a control according to some
strategy.
Definition 4.4. A non-anticipative strategy on [t, τS ] for Player I is a measurable
mapping which we shall denote by α s.th.: α : [t, τS ] × Ω × T to U and for any stopping
time τ : Ω→ T and any F−measurable player II stopping times ρ1, ρ2 ∈ T with ρ1 ≡ ρ2 on
[t, τ ] we have that α(ρ1) ≡ α(ρ2) on [t, τ ].
We define the Player II non-anticipative strategy β : [t, τS ] × Ω × U → T analogously.
Hence, α and β are Elliott-Kalton strategies.
We denote the set of all non-anticipative strategies for Player I (resp., Player II) by
A(t,τs) (resp.,B(t,τs)).
Remark 4.5. The intuition behind definition 4.4 is as follows: suppose player I uses
the control u1 ∈ U and the system follows a path ω and that player II employs the strategy
β ∈ B(t,τs) against the control u1. If in fact player II cannot distinguish between the control
u1 and some other player I control u2 ∈ U then controls u1 and u2 induce the same response
from the player II strategy that is to say β(u1) ≡ β(u2).
Note that when U is a singleton the game is degenerate and collapses into a classical
optimal stopping problem for player II with a value function and solution as that in ch.3 in
[KW00]. Similarly, when T is a singleton the game collapses into a classical impulse control
problem for player I with a value function and solution as that in ch.7 in [KW00].
Definition 4.6. Suppose we denote the space of measurable functions by H, suppose
also that the function φ : [t, τS ] × R
p → Rp s.th. φ ∈ H. Let τ ∈ [t, τS ] and ρ ∈ T
be F− measurable stopping times; we define the [non-local] Player I-intervention operator
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M : H → H acting at τ by the following expression:
M[φ] := inf
z∈Z
[φ(Γ(X(τ−), z)) + c(τ, z) · 1{τ≤ρ∧τS}]
where Γ : Rp ×Z → Rp is the impulse response function defined earlier.
Remark 4.7. Suppose that the value of the game exists and that we denote the value by
V . If V ∈ H, then the termMV (s, x) that is, the non-local intervention operatorM acting
the value function associated to the game, represents the value of the player I strategy that
consists of performing the best possible intervention at some given time s ∈ [t, τS ] when the
state is at x ∈ Rp, then performing optimally thereafter.
Suppose τ ∈ [t, τS ] is some intervention time then the equalityMV (τ, x) = V (τ, x) holds
at the points of intervention ∀x ∈ Rp, we note however, that an immediate intervention may
not be optimal; that is we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4.8. Suppose that the value of the game V exists and that V ∈ H, then the non-
local intervention operatorM satisfies the following inequality pointwise ∀(s, x) ∈ [t, τS ]×R
p:
MV (s, x) ≥ V (s, x). (29)
We give a statement of the following result without proof:
Lemma 4.9.(Lemma 3.10 in [Mk07]) The non-local intervention operator M is
continuous wherein we can deduce the existence of a constants c1, c2 > 0 s.th. ∀x, y ∈ R
p
and s < s′ with s, s′ ∈ [t, τS ]:
i) |MV ±(s, x)−MV ±(s, y)| ≤ c1|x− y|.
ii) |MV ±(t, x)−MV ±(s, x)| ≤ c2|t− s|
β .
A proof of the result is reported in [Mk07].
5 Stochastic Differential Games of Impulse Control and
Stopping
We now study the zero-sum case of the game. The following theorem provides the
conditions under which, if a sufficiently smooth function can be found then we have the value
function of the game. Thus the following verification theorem characterises the conditions
in which the value of the game satisfies a HJBI equation.
We will later use the conditions of Theorem 5.1 in a practical sense to derive the optimal
investment strategy for the optimal liquidity control and lifetime ruin model presented in
section 7.
Theorem 5.1. [Verification Theorem for Zero-Sum Controller-Stopper Games
with Impulse Control]
Suppose the problem is to find φ(x) and (uˆ, ρˆ) ∈ U × T s.th. for all x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p:
φ(x) = sup
ρ∈T
(
inf
u∈U
J (u,ρ)(x)
)
= inf
u∈U
(
sup
ρ∈T
J (u,ρ)(x)
)
= J (uˆ,ρˆ)(x), (30)
where if (uˆ, ρˆ) ∈ U × T exists, it is an optimal pair consisting of the optimal control for
player I and the optimal stopping time for player II (resp.).
Let τ be some F−measurable stopping time and denote by X˜(τ) = X(τ−) + ∆NX(τ),
where ∆NX(τ) denotes a jump at some Fτ−measurable time τ due to N˜ . Suppose that
the value of the game exists. Denote by X(s) ≡ X(s, ·), ∀s ∈ R and φ ≡ φ(·, X) ≡
φ(X), f(·, X) ≡ f(X) ∀X ∈ S.
Suppose also that there exists a function φ that satisifies technical conditions (T1) - (T4)
and the following conditions:
(i) φ ∈ C1,2([t, τS ], S) ∩ C([t, τS ], S¯).
(ii) φ ≤Mφ on S and φ ≥ G(X) on S and the regions D1 and D2 are defined by:
D1 = {X ∈ S;φ(X) <Mφ(X)} and D2 = {X ∈ S;φ(X) > G(X)}
where we refer to D1 (resp., D2) as the player I (resp., player II) continuation region.
(iii) ∂φ
∂s
+ Lφ(X ·,u(s)) + f(X ·,u(s)) ≥ 0 ∀ u ∈ U , X ∈ S\∂D1, s ∈ [t, τS ].
(iv) ∂φ
∂s
+ Lφ(X ·,uˆ(s)) + f(X ·,uˆ(s)) = 0 in D1 ∩D2, s ∈ [t, τS ].
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(v) For u ∈ U , define ρD = ρ
u
D = inf{s > t,X
·,u(s) /∈ D2} and specifically, ρˆD = ρˆ =
inf{s > t,X ·,u(s) /∈ D2}.
(vi) X ·,u(τS) ∈ ∂S P − a.s. on τS <∞ and φ(X
·,u(s)) → G(X ·,u(τS ∧ ρ)) · 1{τS<∞} as
s→ τ−S ∧ ρ
− P− a.s., ∀X ∈ S, u ∈ U .
Put τˆ0 ≡ t and define uˆ := [τˆj , ξˆj ]j∈N inductively by:
τˆj+1 = inf{s > τj ;X
·,uˆ[t,s](s) /∈ D1}∧ τS ∧ρ, then (uˆ, ρˆ) ∈ U ×T are an optimal pair for the
game, that is to say that we have:
φ(x) = inf
u∈U
(
sup
ρ∈T
J (u,ρ)(x)
)
= sup
ρ∈T
(
inf
u∈U
J (u,ρ)(x)
)
(31)
for all x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p.
Theorem 5.1 provides a characterisation of the value of the game in terms of a dynamic
programming equation (which is simply the non-linear PDE in (iv)). In particular, Theorem
5.1 says that given some solution to the non-linear PDE in (iv), then this solution coincides
with the value of the game from which we can calculate the optimal controls for each player.
Before stating the proof of Theorem 5.1, we make the following set of remarks which also
applies to Theorem 5.3.:
Remark 5.2. For the jump-diffusion process considered here, by Lemma 3.7 in [CG14]
we can automatically conclude that ξˆk ∈ argminz∈Z φ(Γ(X
(·)(τk−), z)) + c(τk, z)∀k ∈ N, X ∈
S, τk ∈ [t, τS ] where τk is an F−measurable stopping time exists for the game considered
here.
To prove Theorem 5.1, we firstly require the following result:
Theorem (Approximation Theorem) (Theorem 3.1 in [KW00])
Let Dˆ ∈ S be an open set and let us assume that X(τS) ∈ ∂S and suppose that ∂Dˆ is a
Lipschitz surface. Let ψ : S¯ → R be a function s.th. ψ ∈ C1(S) ∩ C(S¯) and ψ ∈ C2(S\∂Dˆ)
and suppose the second order derivatives of ψ are locally bounded near ∂Dˆ; then there exists
a sequence of functions {ψm}
∞
m=1 ∈ C
2(S) ∩ C(S¯) s.th.:
lim
m→∞
ψm → ψ pointwise dominatedly in S¯.
lim
m→∞
∂ψm
∂xi
→
∂ψ
∂xi
pointwise-dominatedly in S.
lim
m→∞
∂2ψm
∂xi∂xj
→
∂2ψ
∂xi∂xj
and lim
m→∞
Lψm → Lψ pointwise dominatedly in S\∂Dˆ.
We are now in a position to prove the theorem; some ideas for the proof come from
[EBY11b] and [IW81]:
Proof of Theorem 5.1.
Let us fix the player I control uˆ ∈ U and let us define ρm = ρ ∧ m;m = 1, 2 . . .. By
Dynkin’s formula for jump-diffusion processes (see for example Theorem 1.24 in [KW00])
we have:
E[φ(Xt,x0,uˆ(τˆj))] − E[φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆj+1))] = −E
[∫ τˆj+1
τˆj
∂φ
∂s
+ L[φ(Xt,x0,uˆ(s)]ds
]
. (32)
Summing (32) from j = 0 to j = k for some 0 < k < µ(t,ρm)(uˆ) − 1 (recall the definition
of µ(t,s)(u) from definition 4.1) and observe that using (iv) we have that -(∂s + L)[φ] = f ,
hence we have that:
φ(x) −
k∑
j=1
E[φ(Xt,x0,uˆ(τˆj))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆj))]− E[φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆk+1))]
= −E
[∫ τˆk+1
t
(∂φ
∂s
+ L
[
φ(Xt,x0,uˆ[t,s](s)
])
ds
]
= E
[ ∫ τˆk+1
t
f(Xt,x0,uˆ[t,s](s))ds
]
. (33)
Now by definition of the non-local intervention operator M and by choice of ξˆj ∈ Z, we
have that:
φ(Xt,x0,uˆ(τˆj)) = φ(Γ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j ), ξˆj)) =M
[
φ(Xˆt,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j ))
]
+ c(τˆj , ξˆj), (34)
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hence after deducting φ(Xˆt,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j )) from both sides we find:
M
[
φ(Xˆt,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j ))
]
− φ(Xˆt,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j )) + c(τˆj , ξˆj) = φ(X
t,x0,uˆ(τˆj))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j )), (35)
and by (vi) we readily observe that: φ(Xt,x0,uˆ(τs))−φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τs)) = 0, hence after plugging
(35) into (33) we obtain the following:
φ(x) −
k∑
j=1
E[M[φ(Xˆt,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j ))]− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j ))]− E[φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆk+1))]
= E
[ ∫ τˆk+1
t
f(Xt,x0,uˆ[t,s](s))ds+
k∑
j=1
c(τˆj , ξˆj) · 1{τˆj≤τS}
]
. (36)
Note that our choice of ξˆk ∈ Z induces equality in (36).
Since the number of interventions in (36) is bounded above by µ(t,ρm∧τS)(uˆ)∧m for some
m <∞ and (36) holds for any k ∈ N, taking the limit as k →∞ in (36) gives:
φ(x) −
µ(t,ρm∨τS)(uˆ)∑
j=1
E[M[φ(Xˆt,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j ))]− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j ))]
= E
[
φ(Xˆt,x0,uˆ(ρm ∧ τS)) +
∫ ρm∧τS
t
f(Xt,x0,uˆ[t,s])(s))ds +
µ(t,ρm∨τS)(uˆ)∑
j=1
c(τˆj , ξˆj) · 1{τˆj≤ρm∧τS}
]
.
(37)
Now limm→∞
∑µ(t,ρm∨τS )(uˆ)
j=1 E[M[φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j ))] − φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j ))] = 0 since also by
(vi) we have that φ(Xˆt,x0,·(τˆj)) − φ(Xˆ
t,x0,·(τˆ−j )) = 0 P−a.s. when τˆj = τS , we can then
deduce the statement by Lemma 4.9 i.e. using the Ho¨lder continuity of the non-local operator
M. Similarly, we have by (vi) that φ(X ·,uˆ(s))→ G(X ·,uˆ(τS)) · 1{τS<∞} as t→ τ
−
S P−a.s.
Now since ρm∧ τS → ρ∧ τs as m→∞, we can exploit the quasi-left continuity of X (for
further details see [MDG10] (Proposition I.2.26 and Proposition I.3.27)) and the continuity
properties of f , we find that there exists some c > 0 s.th.:
| lim
m→∞
φ(Xˆt,x0,u(ρm ∧ τs)) + lim
m→∞
∫ ρm∧τs
t
f(Xt,x0,uˆ(s))ds|
≤ c lim
m→∞
(
(1 + |Xˆt,x0,uˆ(ρm ∧ τs)|) +
∫ ρm∧τs
t
|Xt,x0,uˆ(s)|ds
)
≤ c(1 + τS)(1 + sup
s∈[t,τS]
|Xt,x0,uˆ(s)|) ∈ L1.
Hence, taking the limit as m→∞ and using the Fatoˆu lemma and (37), we find that:
φ(x) = −
µ(t,ρm∨τS)(uˆ)∑
j=1
E
[
Mφ(Xˆt,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j ))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j ))]
+ E[φ(Xˆt,x0,uˆ(ρm ∧ τS))] +
∫ ρm∧τS
t
f(Xt,x0,uˆ(s))ds +
∑
j≥1
c(τˆj , ξˆj) · 1{τˆj≤ρm∧τS
]
= lim
m→∞
inf E
[
−
µ(t,ρm∨τS)(uˆ)∑
j=1
E[Mφ(Xˆt,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j ))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τ−j ))]
+ φ(Xˆt,x0,uˆ(ρm ∧ τS)) +
∫ ρm∧τS
t
f(Xt,x0,uˆ(s))ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τˆj , ξˆj) · 1{τˆj≤ρm∧τS}
]
≥ E
[
G(Xˆt,x0,uˆ(ρ ∧ τS)) +
∫ ρ∧τs
t
f(Xt,x0,uˆ(s))ds +
∑
j≥1
c(τˆj , ξˆj) · 1{τˆj≤ρ∧τS}
]
,
where we have used that
∑µ(t,ρm∨τS )(uˆ)
j=1 c(τˆj , ξˆj) =
∑
j≥1 c(τˆj , ξˆj) · 1{τˆj≤ρm∧τS}.
Since this holds for all ρ ∈ T we observe that:
φ(x) ≥ sup
ρ∈T
E
[
G(Xˆt,x0,uˆ(ρ ∧ τS)) +
∫ ρ∧τs
t
f(Xt,x0,uˆ(s))ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τˆj , ξˆj) · 1{τˆj≤ρ∧τs}
]
.
(38)
14
Capital Injections with the Risk of Ruin
After which we easily deduce that:
φ(x) ≥ inf
u∈U
sup
ρ∈T
E
[
G(Xˆt,x0,u(ρ ∧ τS)) +
∫ ρ∧τs
t
f(Xt,x0,u(s))ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤ρ∧τs}
]
.
(39)
For the second part of the proof, let us fix ρ′ ∈ T(t,τS) as in (v) and define:
ρD = ρ
u
D = inf
s∈[t,τS]
{s > t;X ·,u(s) /∈ D2}. (40)
Now we choose a sequence {D2,m}
∞
m=1 of open sets s.th. the set D¯2,m is compact with
D¯2,m ⊂ D2,m+1 and D2 = ∪
∞
m=1D2,m and choose ρD(m) = m ∧ infs>tX
·,u(s) /∈ D2,m. By
Dynkin’s formula for jump-diffusion processes and (iii) we have:
φ(x) +
k∑
j=1
E[φ(Xt,x0,u(τj))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j ))]− E[φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−k+1))] (41)
= −E
[ ∫ τk+1
t
∂φ
∂s
+ L[φ(Xt,x0,u(s)]ds
]
≤ E
[ ∫ τk+1
t
f(Xt,x0,u[t,s](s))ds
]
. (42)
Hence,
φ(x) +
k∑
j=1
E[φ(Xt,x0,u(τj))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j ))]
≤ E
[ ∫ τk+1
t
f(Xt,x0,u[t,s](s))ds+ φ(Xˆt,x0,u(τ−k+1))
]
. (43)
Now by definition of M we find that:
φ(Xt,x0,u(τj)) = φ(Γ(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j ), ξj)) ≥Mφ(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j ))− c(τj , ξj). (44)
Subtracting φ(Xˆt,x0,u(τ−j )) from both sides of (44) and summing and negating, we find that:
k∑
j=1
E[φ(Xt,x0,uˆ(τj))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τ−j ))]
≥
k∑
j=1
E[Mφ(Xˆt,x0,u(τ−j ))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τ−j ))]−
k∑
j=1
E[c(τj , ξj)]. (45)
Inserting (45) into (43) gives:
φ(x) +
k∑
j=1
E[Mφ(Xˆt,x0,u(τ−j ))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j ))]− E[φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−k+1))]
≤ E
[ ∫ τk+1
t
f(Xt,x0,u[t,s](s))ds+
k∑
j=1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤ρD(m)∧τs}
]
. (46)
Then letting k→∞ in (46) gives:
φ(x) ≤−
µ(t,ρD (m)∨τS (u)∑
j=1
E[Mφ(Xˆt,x0,u(τ−j ))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j ))] + E[φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u(ρD(m) ∧ τs))
+
∫ ρD(m)∧τs
t
f(Xt,x0,u(s))ds +
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤ρD(m)∧τs}].)
(47)
Again, using the quasi-left continuity of X we find that:
limm→∞[µ(t,ρD(m)∨τS)(u)] ≡ limm→∞[µ(t,ρD(m))(u)∨µ(t,τS)(u)] = µ(t,ρ)(u)∨µ(t,τS)(u), hence
we have that: limm→∞
∑µ(t,ρD (m)∨τS (u)
j=1 E[Mφ(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j )− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j ))] = 0.
15
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Moreover, as in part (i), using the fact that ρD(m) ∧ τS → ρD ∧ τs as m → ∞, we can
deduce the existence of a constant c > 0 s.th.:
lim
m→∞
φ(Xˆt,x0,u(ρD(m) ∧ τs)) + lim
m→∞
∫ ρD(m)∧τs
t
f(Xt,x0,u(s))ds
≤ c lim
m→∞
(1 + |Xˆt,x0,u(ρD(m) ∧ τs)|) +
∫ ρD(m)∧τs
t
|Xt,x0,u(s)|ds)
≤ c(1 + τS)(1 + sup
s∈[t,τS]
|Xt,x0,u(s)|) ∈ L1.
Moreover, using (vi), we observe that: limm→∞ φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u(ρD(m)))
= φ(Xˆt,x0,u(ρD)) = G(Xˆ
t,x0,u(ρD)). Hence, by the dominated convergence theorem after
taking the limit m→∞ in (47) we find that:
φ(x) ≤ E
[ ∫ ρD∧τs
t
f(Xt,x0,u(s))ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤ρD∧τs}+G(Xˆ
t,x0,u(ρD ∧ τS))
]
. (48)
Since this holds for all u ∈ U we have that:
φ(x) ≤ inf
u∈U
E
[ ∫ ρD∧τs
t
f(Xt,x0,u(s))ds +
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤ρD∧τs}
+G(Xˆt,x0,u(ρD ∧ τS))
]
, (49)
from which clearly we have that:
φ(x) ≤ sup
ρ∈T
inf
u∈U
E
[ ∫ ρ∧τs
t
f(Xt,x0,u(s))ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤ρ∧τs} +G(Xˆ
t,x0,u(ρ ∧ τs))
]
,
(50)
where we observe that by (50) and (39) we can conclude that:
inf
u∈U
(sup
ρ∈T
J (u,ρ)(x)) ≤ φ(x) ≤ sup
ρ∈T
( inf
u∈U
J (u,ρ)(x)). (51)
However, since for all u ∈ U , ρ ∈ T and x ∈ Rp we have:
infu∈U (supρ∈T J
(u,ρ)(x)) ≥ supρ∈T (infu∈U J
(u,ρ)(x)). Moreover, choosing u = uˆ in (51), by
(iv) we find equality, hence:
φ(x) = E
[ ∫ ρˆ∧τs
t
f(Xt,x0,uˆ(s))ds+
∑
j≥1
c(τˆj , ξˆj) · 1{τj≤ρˆ∧τs} +G(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(ρˆ ∧ τs))
]
, (52)
from which we find that:
φ(x) = inf
u∈U
(sup
ρ∈T
J (u,ρ)(x)) = sup
ρ∈T
( inf
u∈U
J (u,ρ)(x)), (53)
and hence we deduce the thesis.
Corollary 5.3. The sample space splits into three regions that represent a region in
which player I applies impulse interventions I1, a region for player II stops the game I2, and
a region I3 in which no action is taken by neither player; moreover the three regions are
characterised by the following expressions:
I1 = {x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p : V (x) =MV (x),LV (x) + f(x) ≥ 0},
I2 = {x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p : V (x) = G(x),LV (x) + f(x) ≤ 0},
I3 = {x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p : V (x) <MV (x), V (x) > G(x);LV (x) + f(x) = 0}.
6 Stochastic Differential Games of Impulse Control and
Stopping with Non-Zero-Sum Payoff
In this section, we study the game as studied in section 5, however we now extend the
results to a non-zero-sum stochastic differential game. The results of this section are loosely
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based on [KZ08] where we make the necessary adjustments to accommodate both impulse
controls and the action of the stopper. We start by proving a non-zero-sum verification
theorem for the game in which both players use impulse controls to modify the state process
and lastly adapt the impulse controller-stopper game in section 5 to the non-zero-sum setting.
Suppose firstly that the uncontrolled passive state X ∈ S ⊂ Rp(p ∈ N), evolves according
to a (jump-)diffusion on (C([t, τS ];R
p), (Ft,s)s∈[t,τS],F ,P0) as in sections 2 and 3.
We decouple the objective performance functionals so that we now consider the following
payoff functionals:
J
(u,ρ)
1 (x) = E
[ ∫ ρ∧τS
t
f1(X
t,x0,u(s))ds−
∑
j≥1
c1(τj , ξj)·1{τj≤ρ∧τS}+G1(X
t,x0,u(ρ∧τS))
]
(54)
J
(u,ρ)
2 (x) = E
[ ∫ ρ∧τS
t
f2(X
t,x0,u(s))ds−
∑
j≥1
c2(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤ρ∧τS} +G2(X
t,x0,u(ρ ∧ τS))
]
.
(55)
where (t, x) ∈ [t, τS ]×R
p, τj ∈ [t, τS ]; ξj ∈ Z are F−measurable intervention values ∀ j ∈ N
and u ∈ U is an admissible controls for player I. The cost functions c1 and c2 share the
same properties as c in section 2; we assume also that the functions G1 and G2 are Lipschitz
continuous and bounded.
We can observe the functional J
(u,ρ)
1 (x) (resp., J
(u,ρ)
2 (x)) defines the payoff received by
the player I (resp., player II) during the game with initial point x ∈ [t, τS ]×R
p when player
I uses the control u ∈ U and player II decides to stop the game at time ρ ∈ T .
Since we are now handling a game with a non-zero-sum payoff structure, we must adapt
the definition of the non-local intervention operator M1 : H → H (c.f. definition 4.6) to
M1[φ] := sup
z∈Z
[φ(Γ(X(τ−), z))− c(τ, z) · 1{τ≤τS}] (56)
where φ : [t, τS ]×R
p → R is s.th. φ ∈ C([t, τS ];R
p), τ is some F−measurable stopping time
and as before, γ : Rp ×Z → Rp is the impulse response function.
Definition 6.1. [Nash Equilibrium] We say that a pair (uˆ, ρˆ) ∈ U × T is a Nash
equilibrium of the stochastic differential game with impulse controls u(s) =
∑
j≥1 ξj ·
1{τj<τS}(s) ∈ U for all s ∈ [t, τS ] if the following statements hold:
J
(uˆ,ρˆ)
1 (x) ≥ J
(u,ρˆ)
1 (x) (57)
∀ u ∈ U and ∀ x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p,
J
(uˆ,ρˆ)
2 (x) ≥ J
(uˆ,ρ)
2 (x) (58)
∀ ρ ∈ T and ∀ x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p.
Condition (i) states that given some fixed player II stopping time ρˆ ∈ T , player I cannot
profitably deviate from playing the control policy uˆ ∈ U . Analogously, condition (ii) is
the equivalent statement given the player I’s control policy is fixed as uˆ, player II cannot
profitably deviate from ρˆ ∈ T . We therefore see that (uˆ, ρˆ) ∈ U × T is an equilibrium in
the sense of a Nash equilibrium since neither player has an incentive to deviate given their
opponent plays the equilibrium policy.
As in [Mk07], we generalise our zero-sum Theorem 5.1 to cover non-zero-sum payoff
structure with the use of a Nash Equilibrium solution concept.
As in the zero-sum case, we can give a heuristic motivation of the key features of the
verification theorem for the game when the payoff structure is non-zero-sum by studying the
complete repertoire of tactics that each player can employ throughout the horizon of the
game (see supplementary material).
Theorem 6.2. [Verification Theorem for Non-Zero-Sum Controller-Stopper
Games with Impulse Control]
Let τj , ρ ∈ T be F−measurable stopping times. Denote by X
·,u ≡ X for any u ∈ U
and suppose that there exist functions φi, i ∈ {1, 2} s.th. conditions (T1) - (T4) hold (see
appendix) and additionally:
(i’) φ ∈ C1,2([t, τS ], S) ∩ C([t, τS ], S¯).
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(ii’) φ1 ≥M1φ1 on S and φ2 ≥ G2(X) on S
and the regions D1 and D2 are defined by: D1 = {X ∈ S;φ1(X) > M1φ1(X)} and
D2 = {X ∈ S;φ2(X) > G2(X)} where we refer to D1 (resp., D2) as the player I (resp.,
player II) continuation region.
(iii’) ∂φ1
∂s
+ Lφ1(X
·,u(s)) + f1(X
·,u(s)) ≤ ∂φ1
∂s
+ Lφ1(X
·,uˆ(s)) + f1(X
·,uˆ(s)) ≤ 0
∀ in X ∈ S\∂D1
(iv’) ∂φi
∂s
+ Lφi(X
·,uˆ(s)) + fi(X
·,uˆ(s)) = 0 in D1, i ∈ {1, 2}.
(v’) For u ∈ U define ρD = ρ
u
D = inf{s > t,X
·,u(s) /∈ D2} and specifically, ρˆD = ρˆ = inf{s >
t,X ·,u(s) /∈ D2}
(vi’) X ·,u(τS) ∈ ∂S P−a.s. on τS <∞ and φi(X
·,u(s)) → Gi(X
·,u(τS ∧ ρ)) · 1{τS<∞} as
s→ τ−S ∧ ρ
−, P−a.s., i ∈ {1, 2} ∀ X ∈ S, u ∈ U
Put τˆ0 ≡ t and define uˆ := [τˆj , ξˆj ]j∈N inductively by τˆj+1 = inf{s > τj ;X
·,uˆ(s) /∈
D1} ∧ (τS ∧ ρ), then (uˆ, ρˆ) ∈ U × T is a Nash equilibrium for the game; that is to say that
we have ∀ x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p:
φ1(x) = sup
u∈U
J
(u,ρˆ)
1 (x) = J
(uˆ,ρˆ)
1 (x) (59)
and
φ2(x) = sup
ρ∈T
J
(uˆ,ρ)
2 (x) = J
(uˆ,ρˆ)
2 (x). (60)
Proof
As in the proof of Theorem 5.1, let us fix the player II control ρˆ ∈ T ; we firstly appeal
to the Dynkin formula for jump-diffusions, hence for X = X ·,u we have the following:
E[φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τj+1))]− E[φ1(X
t,x0,u(τj))] = E
[ ∫ τj+1
τj
∂φ1
∂s
+ L[φ1(X
t,x0,u(s)]ds
]
. (61)
Summing (61) from j = 0 to j = k for some k : t < τk+1 < ρˆ implies that:
− φ1(x) −
k∑
j=1
E[φ1(X
t,x0,u(τj))− φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j ))] + E[φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−k+1))]
= E
[ ∫ τk+1
t
∂φ1
∂s
+ L[φ1(X
t,x0,u[t,s](s)]ds
]
. (62)
Now by (iii’) we have that:
∂φ1
∂s
+ Lφ1(X
t,x0,u[t,s](s))
≤
∂φ1
∂s
+ Lφ1(X
t,x0,uˆ[t,s](s)) + (f1(X
t,x0,uˆ(s)) − f1(X
t,x0,u[t,s](s))) ≤ −f1(X
t,x0,u[t,s](s)).
(63)
Hence inserting (63) into (62) yields
−φ1(x)−
k∑
j=1
E[φ1(X
t,x0,u(τj))− φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j ))] + E[φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−k+1))]
= E
[ ∫ τk+1
t
∂φ1
∂s
+ L[φ1(X
t,x0,u[t,s](s)]ds
]
≤ −E
[ ∫ τk+1
t
f1(X
t,x0,u[t,s](s))ds
]
. (64)
Or equivalently:
φ1(x) +
k∑
j=1
E[φ1(X
t,x0,u(τj))− φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j ))]− E[φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−k+1))]
≥ E
[ ∫ τk+1
t
f1(X
t,x0,u[t,s](s))ds
]
. (65)
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We now use analogous arguments to (44) - (45). Indeed, by definition of M1 we find
that:
φ(Xt,x0,u(τj)) = φ(Γ(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j ), ξj)) ≤M1φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j )) + c(τj , ξj). (66)
After subtracting φ(Xˆt,x0,u(τ−j )) from both sides of (66), summing then negating, we find
that:
k∑
j=1
E[φ(Xt,x0,uˆ(τj))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τ−j ))]
≤
k∑
j=1
E[M1φ(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j ))− φ(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τ−j ))] +
k∑
j=1
E[c(τj , ξj)]. (67)
After inserting (67) into (65) we find that:
φ1(x) ≥ E
[
φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−k+1))−
k∑
j=1
[φ1(X
t,x0,u(τj))− φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j ))] +
∫ τk+1
t
f1(X
t,x0,u[t,s](s))ds
]
≥ E
[
φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−k+1))−
k∑
j=1
[M1φ1(X
t,x0,u(τ−j ))− φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j ))]
−
k∑
j=1
c1(τj , ξj) +
∫ τk+1
t
f1(X
t,x0,u[t,s](s))ds
]
.
(68)
Define ρˆm ≡ βˆm(u) = ρˆ ∧m;m = 1, 2 . . .. As in the zero-sum case, since the number of
interventions in (68) is bounded above by µ(t,ρˆm∧τS )(u)∧m for some m <∞ and (68) holds
for any k ∈ N, taking the limit as k →∞ in (68) gives:
φ1(x) ≥ E[φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−k+1))−
µ(t,ρˆm∧τSP (u)∧m∑
j=1
[M1φ1(X
t,x0,u(τ−j ))− φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τ−j ))]
+
∫ ρˆm∧τs
t
f1(X
t,x0,u[t,s](s))ds−
µ(t,ρˆm∧τS (u)∧m)∑
j=1
c1(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤ρ∧τs}].
(69)
Now, limm→∞
∑µ(t,ρˆm∧τS )(u)∧m
j=1 E[M1φ1(X
t,x0,u(τj))− φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τj))]
=
∑µ(ρˆ∧τS)(u)
j=1 E[M1φ1(X
t,x0,u(τj))− φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τj))] = 0 and
limm→∞[φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(τµ(t,ρˆm∧τS (u)∧m)))] = φ1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(ρˆ∧τS)) = G1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(ρˆ∧τS)). Indeed,
by (v’) we have that limm→∞[τµ(t,ρˆm∧τS )(u) ∧m)] = τµ(t,ρˆ∧τs)(u) ≡ ρˆ ∧ τs .
Thus, after taking the limit m→∞ in (69) and noting that by definition, limm→∞ ρˆm = ρˆ,
we have that:
φ1(x) ≥ E
[ ∫ ρˆ∧τs
t
f1(X
t,x0,u[t,s](s))ds−
∑
j≥1
c1(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤ρˆ∧τs} +G1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(ρˆ ∧ τs))
]
.
(70)
Since this holds for all u ∈ U we find:
φ1(x) ≥ sup
u∈U
E
[
G1(Xˆ
t,x0,u(ρˆ ∧ τs)) +
∫ ρˆ∧τs
t
f1(X
t,x0,u[t,s](s))ds−
∑
j≥1
c1(τj , ξj) · 1{τj≤ρˆ∧τs}
]
.
(71)
Hence, we find that ∀x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p
φ1(x) ≥ sup
u∈U
J
(u,ρˆ)
1 (x). (72)
Now, applying the above arguments with the controls (uˆ, ρˆ) yields the following equality
∀ x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p:
φ1(x) = sup
ρ∈T
J
(uˆ,ρ)
1 (x) = J
(uˆ,ρˆ)
1 (x). (73)
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To prove (59) - (60), we firstly fix uˆ ∈ U as in (iv’), we again define ρm = ρ∧m;m = 1, 2 . . ..
Now, by the Dynkin formula for jump diffusions and by (iv’) and (61) - (62), we have that:
E[φ2(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(ρ−m))]− φ2(x)−
µt,ρm (uˆ)∑
j=1
E[φ2(X
t,x0,uˆ(τˆj))− φ2(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j ))]
= E
[ ∫ τˆµt,ρm (uˆ)
t
(∂φ
∂s
+ Lφ2(X
t,x0,uˆ[t,s](s))ds
)]
= −E
[ ∫ τˆµt,ρm (uˆ)
t
f2(X
t,x0,uˆ[t,s](s))ds
]
,
which (as before, similar to (35)) and by our choice of ξˆj ∈ Z, implies
φ2(x) +
µt,ρm (uˆ)∑
j=1
E[M1φ2(X
t,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j ))− φ2(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆ−j ))]
= E
[
φ2(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆµt,ρm (uˆ))) +
∫ τˆµt,ρm (uˆ)
t
f2(X
t,x0,uˆ[t,s](s))ds −
µ(t,ρm)(uˆ)∑
j=1
c2(τˆj , ξˆj) · 1{τˆj≤ρm}
]
,
which we may rewrite as
φ2(x) = E
[
φ2(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆµt,ρm (uˆ))) +
∫ τˆµt,ρm (uˆ)
t
f2(X
t,x0,uˆ[t,s](s))ds
−
µt,ρm (uˆ)∑
j=1
c2(τˆj , ξˆj) · 1{τˆj≤τµt,ρm (uˆ)}
]
−
µt,ρm (uˆ)∑
j=1
E[M1φ2(X
t,x0,uˆ(τ−j ))− φ2(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τ−j ))].
(74)
Now, since µt,ρm(uˆ)→ µt,ρ∧τS(uˆ) asm→∞ and lims→τS φi(Xˆ
t,x0,·(s))→ Gi(Xˆ
t,x0,·(τS)), i ∈
{1, 2} using (v) and τˆρ∧τS ≡ ρ ∧ τS then using (74) and by the Fatoˆu lemma we find that:
φ2(x) ≥ lim inf
m→∞
E
[
φ2(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τˆµt,ρm (uˆ))) +
∫ τˆµt,ρm (uˆ)
t
f2(X
t,x0,uˆ[t,s](s))ds
−
∑
j≥1
c2(τˆj , ξˆj) · 1{τj≤τˆµt,ρm (uˆ)}
−
µt,ρm (uˆ)∑
j=1
E[M1φ2(X
t,x0,uˆ(τj))− φ2(Xˆ
t,x0,uˆ(τj))]]
= E
[
G2(X
t,x0,u(ρ ∧ τS)) +
∫ ρ∧τS
t
f2(X
t,x0,u(s))ds−
∑
j≥1
c2(τˆj , ξˆj) · 1{τˆj≤ρ∧τS}
]
.
(75)
Since this holds for all ρ ∈ T we find that:
φ2(x) ≥ sup
ρ∈T
E
[
G2(X
t,x0,u(ρ ∧ τS)) +
∫ ρ∧τS
t
f2(X
t,x0,uˆ(s))ds−
∑
j≥1
c2(τˆj , ξˆj) · 1{τˆj≤ρ∧τS}
]
.
(76)
Hence, we find that ∀ x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p
φ2(x) ≥ sup
ρ∈T
J
(uˆ,ρ)
2 (x). (77)
Now, applying the above arguments with the controls (uˆ, ρˆ) yields the following equality
∀ x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p:
φ2(x) = sup
u∈U
J
(u,ρˆ)
2 (x) = J
(uˆ,ρˆ)
2 (x) (78)
We therefore observe using (78) in conjunction with (73) and that (uˆ, ρˆ) is a Nash equi-
librium and hence the thesis is proven.
In full analogy to Corollary 5.3, we can readily arrive at the following corollary to The-
orem 5.3:
Corollary 6.4. The sample space splits into three regions that represent a region in
which the controller performs impulse interventions I1, a region in which the stopper stops
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the process I2 and a region in which no action is taken by either player I3; moreover the
three regions are characterised by the following expressions:
I1 =
{
x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p : V1(x) =M1V1(x),LV1(x) + f1(x) ≥ 0
}
,
I2 =
{
x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p : V2(x) = G2(x),LV2(x) + f2(x) ≥ 0
}
,
I3 =
{
x ∈ [t, τS ]× R
p : V1(x) <M1V1(x),
V2(x) < G1(x);LV2(x) + f2(x) = 0, j ∈ {1, 2}
}
.
7 The Optimal Liquidity Control and Lifetime Ruin
Problem
We now revisit the optimal liquidity control and lifetime ruin problem in section II
and solve the model presented in section 2. In the following analysis, we use the results of
the stochastic differential game of impulse control and stopping to solve our model. Before
stating results, using (14) and (2), we firstly make the following observation on the stochastic
generator Lθ which is given by the following expression (s, x, y, q) ∈ [t, T ]× S2 × R:
Lθψ(s, ·) =(r − e)x
∂ψ
∂x
+ Γy
∂ψ
∂y
+
1
2
σ2fx
2 ∂
2ψ
∂x2
+
1
2
pi2σ2Iy
2 ∂
2ψ
∂y2
+
1
2
q2
∂2ψ
∂q2
− σfxq
∂2ψ
∂x∂q
+
∫
R
{
ψ(s, x+ xγf (z), y, q − qθ1(z))
−ψ(s, x, y, q)− xγf (z)
∂ψ
∂x
+ qθ1(z)
∂ψ
∂q
}
ν(dz),
(79)
We now restate Theorem 7.1:
Theorem 7.1. Suppose that the firm’s liquidity process x evolves according to (2) and
suppose that the investor’s wealth process y evolves according to (5) then the sequence
of optimal capital injections (τˆ , Zˆ) ≡ [τˆj , zˆj ]j∈N ≡
∑
j≥1 zˆj · 1{τˆj≤ρˆ∧T}(s) is characterised
by the investment times {τˆj}j∈N and magnitudes {zˆj}j∈N where [τˆj , zˆj ]j∈N are constructed
recursively via the following expressions:
(i) τˆ0 ≡ t0 and τˆj+1 = inf{s > τj ;Y
(τˆ ,Zˆ)[t,s](s) ≥ y˜|y˜ ∈ R, Y ∈ S} ∧ ρˆ,
(ii) zˆj = yˆ − y(τˆj).
The fixed duplet (y˜, yˆ) is determined by the following equations:
φ′2(yˆ) = αI , (80)
φ2(y˜) = φ2,0(yˆ)− (κI + αI(yˆ − y)), (81)
φ′2(y˜) = αI . (82)
where the function φ2 is given by (93) and the function φ2,0 is given by:
φ2,0(x) = c(y
d1 − yd2), (83)
where the constants d1, d2, c ∈ R are given in (158) and (159) - (161).
The investor’s non-investment region is given by:
D2 =
{
Y ∈ S, s ∈ [t, T ];Y (s) < y˜
}
, (84)
The investor exits the market at ρˆ ∈ T where the exit time is defined by:
ρˆ = inf{s > t;X(τˆ ,Zˆ)[t,s](s) ·Q(s) /∈ D1|X ∈ S,Q ∈ R} ∧ τS , (85)
where the process Q is determined by the optimal choice of θˆ = (θˆ0, θˆ1) and the set D1
(non-stopping region) is defined by:
D1 =
{( ∂
∂s
+ Lθˆ
)
ψ(s, ·) > 0
∣∣∣s > t}. (86)
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where the operator Lθˆ corresponds to the stochastic generator of the controlled process.
From Theorem 7.1 we immediately arrive at the following result:
Corollary 7.2. For the optimal liquidity control and lifetime ruin problem, the investor’s
wealth process x lies within a space that splits into three regions: a region in which the
investor performs a capital injection - I1, a region in which no action is taken - I2 and lastly
a region in which the investor exits the market by selling all firm holdings - I3. Moreover,
the three regions are characterised by the following expressions:
I1 = {y ≥ y˜|y, y˜ ∈ S},
I2 = {qx > ω
∗, y < y˜|x, y, y˜ ∈ S;ω∗, q ∈ R},
I3 = {qx ≤ ω
∗|x ∈ S; q, ω∗ ∈ R},
where q is the value of the process Q and the fixed duplet (y˜, yˆ) and the value ω∗ are
determined by (21) - (23) and (171) respectively..
Theorem 7.3. The investor’s problem reduces to the following double obstacle varia-
tional inequality:
inf{sup[ψ(s, ·)− (κI + αI(yˆ − y)),−
( ∂
∂s
+ Lθˆ
)
ψ(s, ·)], ψ(s, ·) −G(s, ·)} = 0, (87)
where G(s, ·) = e−δs(g1xq + λT + g2y).
The investor’s optimal stopping time ρˆ ∈ [t, T ] is given by:
ρˆ = inf{s > t;X(s)Q(s) /∈ D1|s ∈ [t, T ]} ∧ τS , (88)
where the set D1 is the investor’s non-stopping region defined by (28).
Theorem 7.1 and Theorem 7.3. are underpinned by the following results:
Lemma 7.4. The optimal choice of θˆ = (θˆ0, θˆ1) corresponds to the measure Q which is
defined by:
dQ = QdP (89)
and the process Q is determined by the expression ∀ s ∈ [t, T ]:
Q(s) = Q(t) exp
{1
2
σ2fs− σfBf (s) +
∫ s
t
∫
R
(ln(1 + θˆ1(r, z))− θˆ1(r, z))N˜f (dr, dz)
}
, (90)
where θˆ1 is a solution to the equation H(ψ) = 0 where H is given by:
H(ψ) =
∫
R
([Ξ(ψ)]k − 1)ν(dz), (91)
where Ξ(ψ) := (1− θˆ1(z))(1 + γf (z))) and k is a solution to (91).
The following result provides a complete characterisation of the investor’s value function:
Proposition 7.5 The value function ψ for the investor’s (joint) problem (10) - (11) is
given by:
ψ(s, x, y, q) =


e−δsq{φ2(y)− q
−1(κI + αI(yˆ − y))
+ φω(xq)}, S\∂D2
e−δ(T∧ρˆ)(g1xq + λT + g2y), S\∂D1
qe−δs(φ2(y) + φω(xq)) D1 ∩D2
(92)
where the functions φ2 and φω are given by (93) - (94).
φ2(y) =
{
c(yd1 − yd2)− (κI + αI(yˆ − y)), y ≥ y˜
c(yd1 − yd2), y < y˜
(93)
φω(xq) =
{
e−δ(T∧ρˆ)(g1xq + λT ), xq ≤ ω
∗
axkqk, xq > ω∗
(94)
where a, d1, d2 and ω
∗ are constants given by (156) - (158).
Proposition 7.5 provides a complete characterisation of the value function for the in-
vestor’s problem.
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Appendix
Technical Conditions for (T1) - (T4).
(T1) Assume that E[
∫ τs
t
1∂D(X
·,u(s))ds] = 0 for all X ∈ S, u ∈ U where D ≡ D1 ∪D2.
(T2) ∂D is a Lispchitz surface - that is to say that ∂D is locally the graph of a Lipschitz
continuous function: φ ∈ C2(S\∂D) with locally bounded derivatives.
(T3) The sets {φ−(X ·,u(τm)); τm ∈ [t, τS ], ∀m ∈ N} and {φ
−(X ·,u(ρ)); ρ ∈ T } are uniformly
integrable ∀x ∈ S, u ∈ U .
(T4) E[|φ(X ·,u(τm))|+ |φ(X
·,u(ρ))|+
∫ τS
t
|Lφ(X ·,u(s))|ds] <∞,
∀ intervention times τm ∈ [t, τS ], ρ ∈ T , u ∈ U .
Proof of Theorem 7.3.
We prove the theorem by applying the Theorem 5.1 to the model. We wish to fully
characterise the optimal investment strategies for the investor. To put problem (7) - (9)
in terms of the framework of Theorem 5.1 we firstly note that we now seek the triplet
(θˆ, (τ, Z), ρˆ) ∈ R2 × [t, T ]× Φ× T with Φ ⊆ U and T ⊆ [t, T ] s.th.:
J ρˆ,uˆ,θˆ(t, y1, y2, y3) = sup
ρ∈T
(
inf
(τ,Z)∈Φ
(
inf
θ∈R×R
Jρ,u,θ(t, y1, y2, y3)
))
, (95)
where
Jρ,u,θ(t, y1, y2, y3) = E
[
−
∑
m≥1
e−δτm [κI + αI(τm)zm] · 1{τm<τS}
+ e−δ(τS∧ρ)
(
g1Y1
t,y1,(τ,Z)
τS∧ρ Y3 + λT
)
+ g2Y2
t,y2,(τ,Z)
τS∧ρˆ
)]
,
(96)
and θ ≡ (θ0, θ1) ∈ R × R and the dynamics of the state processes Y := (Y1, Y2, Y3) are
expressed via the following:
dY0(s) = dt, (97)
dY1(s) = dX(s);X(t) = y1, (98)
dY2(s) = dY (s);Y (t) = y2, (99)
dY3(s) = −Y3(s)[θ0(s)dBf (s) +
∫
R
θ1(s, z)N˜f(ds, dz)]. (100)
so that Y1, Y2 are processes which represent the firm liquidity processes and the investor’s
wealth process respectively. The processes Y0 and Y3 represent time and market adjustments
to the investor’s wealth process respectively and lastly, we have the following relations for
the state process coefficients:
µ(·, y2) = Γy2, µ(·, y1) = (r − e)y1, (101)
We will restrict ourselves to the case when ∀y1, y2 ∈ S:
σf (·, y2) = σfy2, γI(·, y2) = 0, γf (·, y1) = γfy1, σI(·, y1) = σIy1, Y2(t) = 0 (102)
For the case that includes jumps (i.e γI 6≡ 0, θ1 6≡ 0), we will also impose a set of conditions
on the firm’s discounted rate of return (in particular that it is greater than 1) and the
discount rate, that is we assume the following conditions hold:
r − e
σf
> 1 and δ < σf (1 − σf ). (103)
The continuation regions D2 and D1 for the controller and the stopper respectively now
take the form:
D2 = {y2 ∈ S, s ∈ [t, τS ];ψ(s, y1, y2, y3) <M1ψ(s, y1, y2, y3)}, (104)
D1 =
{
y1 > 0;ψ(s, y1, y2, y3)−G(s, y) > 0
}
, (105)
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where given some φ ∈ H the intervention operator M1φ is given by:
M1φ(s, y1, y2, y3) = inf
ζ∈Z
{φ(s, y1, y2 − ζ, y3)− (κI + αIζ), ζ > 0} (106)
for all (s, y) ∈ [t, T ]× S2 × R and the stopping time ρˆ is defined by:
ρˆ = inf{s > t;ψ(s, ·) /∈ D1|s ∈ [t, T ]} ∧ τS (107)
Our first task is to characterise the value of the game. Now by the conditions of Theorem
5.1, we observe that the following expressions must hold ∀ s ∈ [t, T ]:
ψ(s, y1, ·, y3) = e
−δs
(
g1y1y3 + λT
)
, ∀ y1 ∈ S\D1, ∀ y3 ∈ R (condition (ii)) (108)
ψ(s, y1, ·, y3) ≥ e
−δs
(
g1y1y3 + λT
)
, ∀ y1 ∈ S, ∀ y3 ∈ R (condition (v)) (109)
∂ψ
∂s
+ Lθψ(s, y) ≥ 0, ∀ (y1, y2, y3) ∈ S
2 × R (condition (vi)) (110)
inf
θ∈R×R
{∂ψ
∂s
+ Lθψ(s, y)
}
= 0 ∀ (y1, y2) ∈ D1 ∪D2 (condition (vi)) (111)
Now using (97) - (100) we find that the generator is given by the following expression:
Lθψ(s, y) =(r − e)y1
∂ψ
∂y1
+ Γy2
∂ψ
∂y2
+
1
2
σ2fy
2
1
∂2ψ
∂y1
2 +
1
2
pi2σ2Iy
2
2
∂2ψ
∂y2
2
+
1
2
θ20y
2
3
∂2ψ
∂y23
− θ0y1y3σf
∂2ψ
∂y1∂y3
+
∫
R
{
ψ(s, y1 + y1γf (z), y2, y3 − y3θ1(z))
−ψ(s, y1, y2, y3)− y1γf (z)
∂ψ
∂y1
+ y3θ1(z)
∂ψ
∂y3
}
ν(dz),
(112)
sup
ρ∈T
[
inf
(τ,Z)∈Φ
(
inf
θ∈R×R
Jρ,(τ,Z),θ(y)
)]
= 0 (113)
By (111) and (112) we readily deduce that the first order condition on θˆ0 is given by the
following expression:
θˆ0y
2
3
∂2ψ
∂y23
− y1y3σf
∂2ψ
∂y1∂y3
= 0, (114)
which after some simple manipulation we find that:
θˆ0 = y1y
−1
3 σf∂
2
y1,y3
ψ(∂2y3ψ)
−1, (115)
Now by (vi) of Theorem 5.1 we have that on D1:
∂ψ
∂s
+ Lθψ = 0, (116)
(here f = 0) which implies that:
0 =
∂ψ
∂s
+ (r − e)y1
∂ψ
∂y1
+ Γy2
∂ψ
∂y2
+
1
2
σ2fy
2
1
∂2ψ
∂y1
2 +
1
2
pi2σ2Iy
2
2
∂2ψ
∂y2
2 (117)
−
1
2
σ2fy
2
1
[ ∂2ψ
∂y1∂y3
]2(∂2ψ
∂y23
)−1
+
∫
R
{
ψ(s, y1 + y1γf (z), y2, y3 − y3θ1(z))
−ψ(s, y1, y2, y3)− y1γf (z)
∂ψ
∂y1
+ y3θ1(z)
∂ψ
∂y3
}
ν(dz).
(118)
Let us try as our candidate function ψ(y) = e−δsy3[φ2(y2) + φω(ω)], where ω := y1y3.
Then after plugging our expression for ψ into (118) we find that:
0 = −δ[φ2(y2) + φω(ω)] + (r − e)ωφ
′
ω(ω) + Γφ2(y2) +
1
2
σ2fω
2φ′′ω(ω)+
+
1
2
pi2σ2Iy
2
2φ
′′
2 (y2) +
1
2
θˆ20ω(2φ
′
ω(ω) + ωφ
′′
ω(ω))− θˆ0σfω(2φ
′
ω(ω) + ωφ
′′
ω(ω))
+
∫
R
{
(1− θ1(z))
[
φ2(y2) + φω(ω(1 + γf (z))(1− θ1(z)))
]
−(1− θ1(z))[φ2(y2) + φω(ω)] + ωφω(ω)
′(θ1(z)− γI(z))
}
ν(dz),
(119)
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and (115) now becomes:
θˆ0 = σf
y1(2y3φ
′
ω(ω) + y3ωφ
′′
ω(ω)
y3(2y1φ′ω(ω) + y1ωφ
′′
ω(ω))
= σf . (120)
Hence, substituting (120) into (119) we find that:
0 =− δ[φω(ω) + φ2(y2)] + (r − e− σ
2
f )ωφ
′
ω(ω) + Γy2φ
′
2(y2) +
1
2
pi2σ2Iy
2
2φ
′′
2 (y2)
+
∫
R
{
(1− θ1(z))
[
φ2(y2) + φω(ω(1 + γf (z))(1 − θ1(z)))
]
− (1− θ1(z))[φ2(y2) + φω(ω)] + ωφ
′
ω(ω)(θ1(z)− γI(z))
}
ν(dz),
(121)
Additionally, our first order condition on θˆ1 becomes:∫
R
{
φω(ωΞ) + ωΞφ
′
ω(ωΞ)− φω − ωφ
′
ω
}
ν(dz) = 0. (122)
where Ξ(θˆ1) := (1− θˆ1(z))(1 + γf (z)))
Note that by combining (99) with (120) we immediately arrive at Lemma 7.4.
We can decouple (121) after which we find that when y ∈ D1 ∩D2 we have that:
i) − δφω(ω) + (r − e− σ
2
f )ωφ
′
ω(ω) +
∫
R
{
(1− θ1(z))
[
φω(ω(1 + γf (z))(1− θ1(z)))
]
−(1− θ1(z))φω(ω) + ωφ
′
ω(ω)(θ1(z)− γI(z))
}
ν(dz) = 0,
(123)
ii) − δφ2(y2) + Γy2φ
′
2(y2) +
1
2
pi2σ2Iy
2
2φ
′′
2 (y2) = 0, (124)
We can solve the Cauchy-Euler equation (124) - after performing some straightforward
calculations we find that:
φ2(y2) = c1y
d1
2 + c2y
d2
2 (125)
for some (as yet undetermined) constants c1 and c2 and the constants d1 and d2 are given
by:
d1 =
1
2
−
1
pi2σ2I
(√
(Γ−
1
2
pi2σ2I )
2 + 2piσ2Iδ + Γ
)
(126)
d2 =
1
2
+
1
pi2σ2I
(√
(Γ−
1
2
pi2σ2I )
2 + 2piσ2Iδ − Γ
)
(127)
Since ψ(t) = Y2(t) = 0, we easily deduce that c2 = −c1, after which we deduce that φ2 is
given by the following expression:
φ2(y2) = c(y
d1
2 − y
d2
2 ) (128)
where c := c1 = −c2 is some as of yet undetermined constant.
To obtain an expression for the function φω , in light of (128) we conjecture that φω takes
the form:
φω = aω
k (129)
where a and k are some constants. Using (129) and (123), we find the following:
Lqφω(ω) = aω
kp(k) (130)
where the operator Lq is defined by the following expression for some function φ ∈ C1,2([t, τS ],R):
Lq[φ(w)] := −δφw(w) + (r − e − σ
2
f )wφ
′
w(w)
+
∫
R
{
(1− θˆ1(z))
[
φ(w(1 + γf (z))(1− θˆ1(z)))− φ(w)
]
+ wφ′(w)(θˆ1(z)− γf (z))
}
ν(dz),
(131)
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and p(k) is defined by:
p(k) := −δ + (r − e − σ2f )k +
∫
R
{
(1− θˆ1(z))[Ξ(θˆ1)
k − 1] + k(θˆ1(z)− γf (z))
}
ν(dz), (132)
where Ξ(θˆ1) := (1− θˆ1(z))(1 + γf (z))).
Note that using (129) the first order condition on θˆ1 (c.f. (122)) now becomes:∫
R
(Ξk − 1)ν(dz) = 0. (133)
Hence using (133), (132) becomes:
p(k) := −δ + (r − e − σ2f )k + k
∫
R
(θˆ1(z)− γf (z))ν(dz), (134)
We now make the following observations:
p(0) = −δ < 0, p(1) = r − e − δ − σ2f −
∫
R
(θ1(z)− γf (z))ν(dz) > 0,P− a.s. (135)
using condition (103). We therefore now deduce the existence of a value z ∈ (0, 1) s.th.
p(z) = 0. We now conclude that ∀ y3 ∈ R, y1 ∈ S we have that:
φω(ω) = aω
k (136)
where a is an arbitrary constant and where k is a solution to the equation:
p(k) = 0. (137)
We now split the analysis into two parts in which we study the investor’s capital injections
(impulse control) problem and the investor’s optimal stopping problem separately. We then
later recombine the two problems to construct our solution to the problem.
The Investor’s Capital Injections Problem
We firstly tackle the investor’s capital injections problem, in particular we wish to ascer-
tain the form of the function φ2 and describe the intervention region and the optimal size
of the investor’s capital injections.
Our ansatz for the continuation region D2 is that it takes the form:
D2 = {y2 > y˜2, |y2, y˜2 ∈ S}. (138)
Therefore by (ii) of Theorem 5.1 for y2 /∈ D2 we have that
ψ(s, y) =Mψ(s, y) = inf{ψ(s, y1, y2 − ζ, y3) + (κI + αIζ), ζ > 0}
⇐⇒ φ2(y2) = inf{φ2(y2 − ζ) + (κI + αIζ), ζ > 0}. (139)
Let us define the function h by the following expression:
h(ζ) = φ2(y2 − ζ)− (κI + αIζ). (140)
Hence we see that the first order condition for the minima ζˆ(y2) ∈ Z of the function h is
h′(ζ) = φ′2(y2 − ζˆ) = αI (141)
Let us now consider a unique point yˆ2 ∈ (0, y˜2) s.th.:
φ′2(yˆ2) = αI . (142)
and
yˆ2 = y2 − ζˆ(y2) or ζ(yˆ2) = yˆ2 − y2. (143)
Then, after imposing a continuity condition at y2 = y˜2, by (139) we have that
φ2(y˜2) = φ2,0(yˆ2)− (κI + αI(yˆ2 − y˜2)) (144)
where φ2,0(y2) = φ2(y2) on D2 where φ2 is given by (128). Additionally, be construction of
y˜2 we have that:
φ′2(y˜2) = αI . (145)
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Hence we deduce that the function φ2 is given by the following expression:
φ2(y2) =
{
c(yd12 − y
d2
2 ) + (κI + αI(yˆ2 − y2)), y2 > y˜2
c(yd12 − y
d2
2 ), y2 ≤ y˜2
(146)
where d1 and d2 are given by (126) - (127).
We can use the system of equations (142), (144) and (145) to compute the constants a,
yˆ2 and y˜2.
The Investor’s Optimal Stopping Problem
Our ansatz for the continuation region D1 is that it takes the form:
D1 = {ω = y1y3 < y
∗
1y
∗
3 = ω
∗|y1, y
∗
1 ∈ S, y3, y
∗
3 ∈ R} (147)
If we assume that the high contact principle holds, in particular if we have differentiability
at ω∗ then, using (129) we obtain the following equations:
(i) aω∗k = g1ω
∗ + λT ,
(ii) akω∗k−1 = g1,
by continuity and differentiability at ω∗. Since the system of equations (i) - (ii) completely
determine the constants a and ω∗, we can compute the values of ω∗ and a in (129), after
which we find:
ω∗ =
λT k
g1(1− k)
, a =
(g1
k
)k( λT k
1− k
)1−k
. (148)
The Investor’s Value Function and Joint Problem
Using (100) and (120) we now see that the process Y3 is determined by the expression:
dY3(s) = −
[
σfY3dBf (s) + Y3(s)
∫
R
θˆ1(s, z)N˜f(ds, dz)
]
. (149)
P−a.s., where θˆ1 is determined by the equation (c.f. (133)):∫
R
(Ξk − 1)ν(dz) = 0, (150)
where Ξ(θˆ1) := (1− θˆ1(z))(1 + γf (z))).
Using Itoˆ’s formula for Itoˆ-Le´vy processes, we can solve (150), moreover since
EQ
[
X + λT
]
= EP
[(
X + λT
)
Y3
]
, (c.f. (9)), the process Y3 represents the Radon-Nikodym
derivative of the measure Q with respect to the measure P (i.e. Y3(s) =
d(Q|Fs)
d(P|Fs)
). Combining
these two statements and denoting Y3 by Q immediately gives the result stated in Lemma
7.4.
Our last task is to combine the results together and fully characterise the investor’s value
function. We firstly note that putting the above results together yields the following double
obstacle variational inequality:
sup{inf[ψ(s, y)− (κI + αI(yˆ2 − y2)),−
( ∂
∂s
+ Lθˆ
)
ψ(s, y)], ψ(s, y)−G(s, y)} = 0, (151)
where y = (y1, y2, y3) and G(s, y) = e
−δs(g1y1y3 + g2y2) and the investor’s stopping time is
given by:
ρˆ = inf{s > t;Y1(s)Y3(s) /∈ D1|s ∈ [t, T ]}, (152)
where the stochastic generator Lθˆ is defined via the following expression:
Lθψ(s, y) = (r − e)y1
∂ψ
∂y1
+ Γy2
∂ψ
∂y2
+
1
2
σ2fy
2
1
∂2ψ
∂y1
2 +
1
2
pi2σ2Iy
2
2
∂2ψ
∂y2
2
+
1
2
θ20y
2
3
∂2ψ
∂y23
− θ0y1y3σf
∂2ψ
∂y1∂y3
+
∫
R
{
ψ(s, y1 + y1γf (z), y2, y3 − y3θ1(z))
−ψ(s, y1, y2, y3)− y1γf (z)
∂ψ
∂y1
+ y3θ1(z)
∂ψ
∂y3
}
ν(dz),
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and where the function θˆ1 satisfies the first order condition (150).
The double obstacle problem in (87) characterises the value for the game, this proves
Theorem 7.3.
Combining (129) and (146) and using (108) shows that the value function ψ(s, y) is given
by:
ψ(s, y) =


e−δsy3{φ2(y2) + y
−1
3 (κI + αI(yˆ2 − y2))
+ (φω(y1y3))}, S\∂D2
e−δ(T∧ρˆ)[g1y1y3 + λT + g2y2], S\∂D1
y3e
−δs[φω(y1y3) + φ2(y2)] D1 ∩D2
(153)
where the functions φ2 and φω are given by the following:
∀ y1 ∈ S:
φω(y1y3) =
{
e−δs[g1y1y3 + λT ], y1y3 ≤ ω
∗
ayk1y
k
3 , y1y3 > ω
∗
(154)
and ∀ y2 ∈ S:
φ2(y2) =
{
c(yd12 + y
d2
2 )− (κI + αI(yˆ2 − y2)), y2 > y˜2
c(yd12 − y
d2
2 ), y2 ≤ y˜2
(155)
The constants a, ω∗ are given by:
ω∗ =
λT k
g1(1− k)
, a =
(g1
k
)k( λT k
1− k
)1−k
, (156)
and the constants d1 and d2 are given by:
d1 =
1
2
−
1
pi2σ2I
(√
(Γ−
1
2
pi2σ2I )
2 + 2piσ2I δ + Γ
)
(157)
d2 =
1
2
+
1
pi2σ2I
(√
(Γ−
1
2
pi2σ2I )
2 + 2piσ2I δ − Γ
)
, (158)
The constants c, yˆ2, y˜2 are determined by the set of equations:
y˜d12 − yˆ
d1
2 + y˜
d2
2 − yˆ
d2
2 = c
−1(αI(y˜2 − yˆ2)− κI) (159)
d1yˆ
d1−1
2 − d2yˆ
d2−1
2 = αIc
−1 (160)
d1y˜
d1−1
2 − d2y˜
d2−1
2 = αIc
−1, (161)
and the constant k is a solution to the equation p(k) = 0 where the function p is given by5:
p(k) := −δ + (r − e− 1)k + k
∫
R
(θˆ1(z)− γf (z))ν(dz), (162)
where θˆ1 is a solution to (91). This proves Proposition 7.5.
Though obtaining a closed analytic solution to p(k) = 0 represents a difficult task,
the solution may be approximated using numerical methods. As we show in the following
section, the analytic intractability of the equation p(k) = 0 is alleviated when the jumps in
the diffusion processes are removed.
The Case γI ≡ 0, θ1 ≡ 0
If the investor’s liquidity process contains no jumps (i.e. γf ≡ 0 and θ1 ≡ 0 in (2) and
(100) (resp.)) then we can obtain closed analytic solutions for the parameters of the function
φω. Indeed, when γI ≡ 0 and θ1 ≡ 0 using (162) we see that the expression for p(k) reduces
to:
p(k) := −δ + (r − e− σ2f )k. (163)
We can therefore solve for k after which we find that the function φω is given by:
φω(y1y3) =
{
e−δs[g1y1y3 + λT ], y1y3 ≤ ω
∗
ay∗k1 y
∗k
3 , y1y3 > ω
∗
(164)
5For the case that includes jumps in the firm liquidity process, we assume that the firm’s discounted rate
of return is greater than 1 and the discount rate is relatively small compared to the volatility parameter σf
as given in condition (103).
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where
k =
δ
r − e − σ2f
, (165)
and where the constants a, ω∗, d1, d2 are determined by (156)- (158) and the constants c, yˆ, y˜
are determined by the set of equations:
y˜d1 − yˆd1 + y˜d2 − yˆd2 = c−1(αI(y˜ − yˆ)− κI) (166)
d1yˆ
d1−1 − d2yˆ
d2−1 = αIc
−1 (167)
d1y˜
d1−1 − d2y˜
d2−1 = αIc
−1, (168)
We therefore immediately arrive at the following result: The following lemma provides a
complete charactersation of the value function for the investor’s problem when the liquidity
process contains no jumps:
Lemma 7.6. For the case in which the investor’s liquidity process contains no jumps
(i.e. γf ≡ 0 in (2)) we can obtain the following (closed analytic expression) for the function
ψ:
ψ(s, x, y, q) =


e−δsq{φ2(y)− q
−1(κI + αI(yˆ − y))
+ φω(xq))}, S\∂D2
e−δ(T∧ρˆ)(g1xq + λT + g2y), S\∂D1
qe−δs(φ2(y) + φω(xq)) D1 ∩D2
(169)
where the function φ2 is given by (93) and the function φω is given by the following:
∀ x ∈ S, q ∈ R:
φω(xq) =
{
e−δ(T∧ρˆ)(g1xq + λT ), xq ≤ ω
∗
axkqk, xq > ω∗,
(170)
where k, a and ω∗ are given by:
k =
δ
r − e− σ2f
, ω∗ =
λT k
g1(1− k)
, a =
(g1
k
)k( λT k
1− k
)1−k
. (171)
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